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Abstract
In response to the growing tension between civil liberties and civil rights, this research
investigates the relationship between the relative expansiveness of free speech and a the
nationwide propensity for hate crimes. I argue that government’s legal limitations of speech
influence the development of linguistic and hierarchical norms in a national culture. Given
structural inequality’s association to violence and crimes of intimidation, I hypothesize that as
the government expands the legal bounds of free speech, the national propensity for hate crimes
decreases. Text analyses of 50 influential freedom of expression rulings in the United States
(U.S.) Supreme Court from 1919-2019 demonstrate the United States’ increased tendency over
the past century to rule with an increasingly expansive interpretation of freedom of expression. A
conglomeration of secondary source data of prejudice-motivated victimizations in the U.S. over
the same century creates an image of a rising annual hate crime victimization. This data and
other findings within the research suggest that the national attention to hate crimes and tendency
to record these incidents was deeply intertwined with cultural development in the U.S.,
specifically as it relates to social movements and attitudes towards diversity.
Key Words: Hate Crimes; Free Speech; Supreme Court; Constitutional Law;
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“Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and
sorrow, and…inflict great pain. [W]e cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a
Nation we have chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to
ensure that we do not stifle public debate.” --Supreme Court Justice John Roberts, 2011
Introduction
Americans frequently assume free speech is the best solution to balancing the harm of
hate with the desire for liberty. The classic American argument is that the best solution for hate is
open discussion in a “marketplace of ideas;” that in order to permit the speech we love, we must
also permit the speech we hate. Yet, others argue, “racial insults and remarks are among the most
pervasive means by which discriminatory attitudes are imparted, communicating the message
that distinctions of race are ones of merit, dignity, status, and personhood” (Delgado & Stefancic,
2018, pp. 7-8). Thus, the debate between free speech absolutists and supporters of hate-speech
laws, such as the policies several Western European countries have implemented, persists today.
This project asks, how has the evolving definition of free speech influenced the
propensity for hate crimes in the United States? I argue that as the definition of free speech
became liberalized to allow for a wider array of ideas, the national severity and frequency of hate
crimes declined. “Free speech” refers to the enacted reality of the First Amendment’s Free
Speech clause that states, “Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech” (U.S.
Const. Amend. I). In this research, I employ a functioning definition for “hate crimes” adapted
from multiple sources, including definitions from multiple government and non-government
agencies. For the purpose of this study, I built upon existing sources to define hate crimes as
‘convicted or non-convicted crime committed within one’s non-governmental, individual
capacity, which was motivated by the actor’s prejudice against the victim’s race, religion,
disability, sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender, or gender identity’ (American Civil Liberties
Union, 2021; Anti-Defamation League, 2019; Department of Justice, 2021; Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 2021; Southern Poverty Law Center, 2021;). Further, in this study hate crimes are
recorded by the number of victims, and a crime is recorded as “motivated by prejudice,” at the
word of police records, victim testimony, and historical documentation.
I argue free speech has become liberalized to allow for more speech, regardless of the
chilled usage of overtly racist speech from the pre-civil rights era because Supreme Court rulings
expanded the breadth of ideas outside the dominant culture legally permitted to be expressed.
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This expansion occurred alongside cultural development, by which the dominant culture
legitimized changing ideas and lifestyles, producing a more hospitable environment for some
minorities. While open speech may allow for the legitimization of extremist prejudice within
factions, the culture of the majority tends to neutralize overt and normalized prejudice overtime –
resulting in an environment that may still be harmful to some communities.
From a policy perspective, this is increasingly important. Rights for various historically
oppressed minority groups have gradually become explicitly included within mainstream
ideology rather than outcasted ideas. In order to change prejudice views, it is necessary that those
views be challenged in discussion rather than silenced, maintained, and martyred by their holders
(Strossen, 2018). The threat of prejudiced violence is greatly prevalent today, and in the attempt
to mitigate the harms engendered by socially validated hate speech, it is important to recognize
the hyper polarizing effects of technology leading the hate fueled violence we see today.
In what follows, I first review the relevant literature comparing the perspectives favoring
and opposing hate speech restriction, present my theoretical framework for the relationship
between hate crimes and free speech in a diversifying society, and highlight my hypothesis for
testing. Then, I outline my methodology and present the results of my research. Finally, I discuss
the important implications of this research and conclude with an exploration of potential avenues
for future research. If the global community can better understand the role speech laws play in
creating a national tendency towards tolerance, it may prevent harm to the minority from tyranny
of the majority.
Literature Review
Pro-Hate Speech Restriction
Scholars in favor of hate-speech laws pose arguments which are less familiar to
Americans than the justifications for free speech absolutism. The foundation of these arguments
for hate speech laws is the premise that persistent racist speech creates structural disparities and
discrimination (Calvart, 1997). Hate speech and stigmatizing expressions are capable of
inflicting psychological pressures on the group and societal level, and individuals who live in
minority stress are likely to incur physical health problems after experiencing a major
prejudice-related event (Frost, Lehavot, & Meyer, 2015; Quinn, 2017). The harm of such
expression seriously outweighs the harm of suppressing it (Massaro, 1991); while derogatory
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speech itself may not create imminent externally expressed harm, it creates an environment
where the vocal degradation and prejudice are perpetuated (Stengel, 2019). Hate speech is
responsible for creating and sustaining identity-based hierarchy by assaulting the dignity of its
targets (Waldron, 2012; Heyman, 2008). Others argue that hate speech attacks self-respect
specifically, which diminishes agency and entitlement to free speech (Seglow, 2016). In light of
the harms caused by hate speech, arguments favoring free speech are arguably a paternalistic
way the majority maintains power over the minority by asserting they know better than the
victims of hate speech. While moving through society ignorant of the differential terrains created
by subliminal social hierarchy, the majority purports that targeted minorities should just toughen
up and educate the racists themselves. However, the debate on who is responsible for mitigating
hate speech debate needs to be understood in the context of a power dynamic (Delgado &
Stephanic, 2018). In short, proponents of hate speech regulation argue generating equality is
necessary to guarantee universal access to the First Amendment; that the First Amendment
should not be prioritized above the 13th (Waldron, 2012; Heyman, 2008; Delgado & Stephanic,
2018).
Another line of argument asserts that tolerating the intolerant will empower the very
ideas which seek to undo the principals of tolerance and liberty (Marcuse, 1965). There is
insufficient evidence to confirm the notion that good ideas eradicate bad ones. Rather in today’s
society, the First Amendment is an outdated system when essentially everyone has a megaphone
online, often permitting the most bigoted ideas to make waves. Further, huge accumulations of
money drown out anti-establishment ideas by creating cohesive ideologies for the purpose of
predisposing the public to favor ideas upholding the current power hierarchy (Delgado &
Stephanic, 2018; Marcuse, 1965; Stengel, 2019).
Pro-Free Speech
The more familiar arguments in favor of free speech have been in circulation before the
independence of the United States. These initial arguments were not positioned against the
egalitarian viewpoints of their current opposition. Rather, they responded to totalitarian
ideologies which positioned government as the force by which a state’s leader-maintained
dominance via a multitude of methods, including punishing treasonous and unfavorable speech.
Contrasting this totalitarian status quo, Baruch Spinoza positioned free speech as essential to a
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stable government. Prohibiting speech allows people to make martyrs of themselves for their
suppressed ideas and by effect, strengthens the case for their suppressed idea. If a government
declares an idea so dangerous it cannot be spoken, curiosity and intrigue strengthen the idea’s
circulation and justification. The overt suppression of a particular idea destabilizes a government
regardless if that government otherwise ensures liberty for its civilians (1670). Along this line of
thought, John Stuart Mill argued that the point of government is liberty, with the purpose of
generating a better life for its civilians. Mill was skeptical of both government tyranny and of
what he called tyranny of the majority, the tendency for the majority to castigate minorities’
ideas and ways of life:
“Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there needs protection
also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to
impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on
those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of
any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves
upon the model of its own.”
-

On Liberty, 1859

Many current scholars argue free speech guarantees minorities access to redress their
grievances and strive for equal rights (American Civil Liberties Union, 2020; Strossen, 2018). If
minorities have an issue with something going on in society, the solution is not to attempt to ban
particular sectors of speech, but rather to encourage open dialogue and counter-speech (Strossen,
2018, p. 34; Milton, 1644; Lepoutre, 2017). In addition to potential government instability
generated by restricting speech, censorship would plainly be ineffective (Spinoza, 1670). Some
scholarship even claims there is not substantial evidence to claim that hate speech is responsible
for sustaining identity-based social hierarchies (Simpson, 2012). Finally, Goldberg assumes on
the face that free speech should be kept as expansive as possible, and limitations to such speech
to account for the harms it produces should not be implemented if there is any less than direct
harm similar to that which could have been caused by conduct (2016).
This review of the literature outlined the major arguments within the current academic
dialogue about the effects of speech laws. Yet, one key limitation with the literature to date is it is
largely theoretical in nature, lacking a wide scale analysis of the observable effects of restricting
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or permitting speech. I aim to contribute to this literature by producing a historically-based
analysis of the relationship between expanding free speech and its effects on hate crime rates in
the United States.
Theory
Evolving Norms Surrounding Speech
To address this puzzle, I present a new theoretical framework. Specifically, I argue that in
a diversifying society, allowing a wider breadth of speech over time is more likely to decrease
the state’s propensity for hate crimes. I begin with the assumption that the country has a baseline
level of social, political, and economic inequality, and has patterns of both immigration and
diversification. Independent of time and place, waves of high immigration are regularly met with
waves of anti-immigrant sentiment unless the locality’s population already has an immigrant-rich
population (Kauffman, 2014; History, 2020; McLaren, Neundorf & Paterson, 2020).
In a white-dominated society, whites who do not necessarily dislike racial/ethnic
outgroups but still feel a sense of white racial solidarity tend to be motivated to “preserve
whiteness” in an attempt to maintain their superior status in the country’s racial hierarchy
(Jardina, 2019). White-dominated societies experiencing anti-immigrant contempt, during an
influx if immigration, are likely to voice that contempt among one another. Communication is
reflective of the worldviews in society. Thus, majority member’s contempt for minorities
provokes a public anti-immigration dialogue that is likely to evolve into an ideology which
functionally suppresses the expanse of minorities’ social and political rights. Similarly,
communication influences worldviews. As derogatory language is normalized, the population
becomes desensitized to the offensiveness of the speech, and societies become more accepting of
hate speech than minorities (Soral & Bilewicz, 2020). The language in society then casually and
systematically oppresses minority groups and groups not in power, resulting in the use of
derogatory language to legitimized discrimination and group hierarchies (Cervone et. al., 2021).
It is possible for minority groups to generate contempt for the oppressively domineering
group. With a wider permission for speech, ideas outside of the dominate ideology are
communicated. Though the view of communication as an agent of change, more expansive
speech enables minority group members to find identification and support amongst one another
and linguistically narrate their contempt for the majority’s oppressive tendencies, similar to (but
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functionally divergent from) the domineering group’s normalization of derogatory language
about minority groups. As the contemptuous dialogue contempt spreads throughout minority
populations, their potential to network and organize in opposition among one another expands.
Majority members who feel guilty for systematic oppression are likely to become more
supportive of the petition for minority protection policies (Swim & Miller, 1999). Other majority
members may feel anger towards in-group advantage, which motivates majority members to
political action supportive of the minorities (Leach, Iyer & Pedersen, 2006). As a result of these
functions, and political pressure, some majority members in positions of institutional power may
heed to the petitioners demands for legal equality and protection for minorities. Systematic
changes then begin to take place--bettering the social, political, and economic position of the
minority group. This does not mean absolute equality will be able to take place, but it does mean
there is a potential for things to improve. This is especially likely if legal protections result in a
decrease in income inequality, and if the community has a strong and vocal consensus in their
opposition to derogatory language (McLaren, Neundorf & Peterson, 2020; Paluck & Chue,
2017). Strong norms against hate speech promote a more hospitable environment for
diversification in society. And as time and diversity progress simultaneously, the majority
increasingly tends to have a positive outlook or regard towards minorities. Through ‘inoculation’
of sorts, each new group requesting a place in society makes the process easier for the next--as
society becomes accustomed to the social practice of opening space for those who are different.
In societies characterized by minimized permission for speech, fear of punishment by
government authorities can result in self-censorship. Individuals who self-censor due to the
conflict between their views and the government’s views (e.g. McCarthyism) lack a space to air
their grievances. Consider how digital domestic surveillance generates anxiety for significant
portions of Americans. An increase in domestic intelligence gathering has been demonstrated to
influence online behavior (causing some people to avoid contexts they fear the government may
find suspicious) and create a documentable chilling effect on online political discourse (Best,
Krueger, & Pearson-Merkowitz, 2012; O’Connor & Jahan, 2014; Robinson & Tannenberg, 2019;
Stoycheff et. al., 2019). As it has online and in other domains (e.g. sodomy laws, Red Scare) the
looming threat of reprehension for expressing particular ideas functions as a government
panopticon that can extinguish and chill the expression and circulation of ideas and identities
disliked by the government (Lugg, 2006; Stoycheff et. al. 2019). In these contexts, the
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government regulates the realm of permissibly expressible ideas. Even if the government’s
position on the ideas they suppress are morally ambiguous, (although it is clear they have more
leeway than minorities) the majority is not exempt from reprehension for disagreeing with the
dominant, government-endorsed position (e.g. the lynching of white allies in the 19th and 20th
century1). Thus, even a majority opposed to the government’s position will chill their speech-further stifling the feasibility of opposition.
In the absence of opposition, if the majority is empowered by the ideology the
government supports, their incentive to speak out against an immoral government ideology is
reduced. Stagnation arises as a result of the disincentivizing respective power reduction the
majority would incur by effectively assisting minorities with the costly task of dismantling the
ideology. Additionally, when speech is siphoned to the point where a limited number of linguistic
networks have accessible persuasive power, the easiest cognitive route is to think in terms of the
dominating narrative--that which is hegemonically perpetuated and favors the domination of the
ruling group. Ideologies are linguistic networks which structure a set of interwoven beliefs and
attitudes into a particular structure for making sense of the world. Ideologies construct a
framework to explain social, political, and economic relations through a rhetorically blinding
web. It becomes impossible to explain alternative viewpoints if the language has evolved to
favor one understanding of the world while naturally discounting others. Hegemonically
dominant ideologies function as the master narrative of a society, which has a tendency to
become internalized by the population and self-perpetuating. Hegemonic ideologies are
immutably present throughout history, location, and context; they are the dominant narratives,
value systems, and corresponding linguistic networks used to uphold and legitimize power,
hierarchy, and “normalcy” in culture. The rhetorical power ingrained hegemonic ideologies yield
are socially and cognitively perpetuated without force. When the ability to circulate oppositional
perspectives is stifled, this effect is inflated--demeaning oppositional ideas as “unnatural,”
“weird,” or “unpatriotic,” and causing individuals to self-censor their expression to avoid
reprimand or reason their thoughts to cohere with the dominant narrative (O’Connor & Jahan,
2014; Palczewski, Ice & Fritch, 2016; Robinson & Tannenberg, 2019; Westen, 2007).
Governments which use regionally based election systems to allocate a substantial
portion of political power are not likely to support protection for the most disparaged groups
1

NAACP, 2021
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because they are elected by a particular constituency with particularized interests, not the
collective population of the country. Especially without term limits, these officials conduct their
political action with the motivation of maintaining their office through continuous re-election, or
minimally, maintaining a positive public image (at least to their voting coalition/community of
origin) for a positive continued social existence in their community after holding office. In
office, it is their sworn responsibility to serve their constituents (what model of representation
they choose is irrelevant). They advocate for policy intended to positively impact the well-being
of some, or all, of their (voting) constituents. If not, for policy their constituents are oblivious to,
or minimally, policy they can convince their voting constituents to tolerate. Adding an additional
layer, their constituents have competing interests which favor the distribution of power in
particular allotments to particular groups. It would oppositional to an elected official’s driving
motivators to propose a policy that would disadvantage or upset their constituents regardless of
its prospect for bringing a nation a step closer to holistic social, political, or economic equality.
Even nationally elected leaders obtain their position by a voting coalition with particular,
nonuniversal interests. Successful political narratives, even on the national level, establish an
antagonist to motivate voting (Westen, 2007). Furthermore, the majority tends to silence and
ostracize the most oppressed minorities (particularly those who meaningfully stand in opposition
to the dominant ideology); keeping them from political power if possible. Even as one previously
oppressed group is advocated for in government policy, there is always a group that is
unknowingly or intentionally excluded to justify the uplifted group’s desert to equity.
Connection to Violence and Crime
How then does this relate to expressions of violence or hate crimes? Hate crimes are
innately intertwined with the drive to maintain social dominance. The structural inequality
hegemonic ideologies frequently create promote violence and crimes of intimidation (Krieger &
Meierrieks, 2019; Krishnan, 2005; Vélez, Krivo & Peterson, 2003). There are four documented
motives of hate crime perpetrators: thrill seeking, retaliation, defensive, and mission based
(McDevitt, Levin, Bennett, 2002). Inevitably, those in power are motivated to stay in power, and
the dominant hegemonic ideology upholds social hierarchy, promoting the majority’s felt
entitlement to power and privilege. When there is weakness in the hegemonic facade, violence or
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intimidation is necessary to silence dissent and maintain dominance (Choi, 2017). By nature,
ideas opposing the dominant ideology endanger the existing societal order.
A nation with limited speech permits some speech and limits other speech; thus, it favors
the language of some dominating ideology and restricts language in opposition to that
perspective. Since those in power are likely to favor ideologies which legitimize their power,
there is ultimately an ostracized group who dissents to that group’s accumulation of power. A
national perpetuation of one dominating ideology ostracizes dissenters, deepening inequality and
distrust by targeting those who protest their undermined sense of agency in society. Ultimately,
people subjected to structural inequality and threatened into ideological conformity are
oppressed. If only the government’s preferred ideology is permitted, some group (opposition) is
ultimately silenced, and means of reprimand will breed to extinguish opposition. Frequently,
those means of reprimand take the form of hate crimes. Thus, a more limited range of speech
will increase a nation’s propensity for hate crimes. And importantly, from my perspective, the
opposite is also true – expanding what is considered free speech should similarly have a positive
effect on reducing the likelihood of hate crimes.
Hypothesis 1: As more speech is permitted by government, the nationwide
propensity for hate crimes decreases.
Methods
To address these questions, I employ an observational analysis of the United States to
assess the relationship between the restriction of expression (my explanatory variable) and
prejudice-motivated violence (my depending variable or outcome of interest). I analyze how the
First Amendment has been interpreted throughout the past century in the U.S. Supreme Court (in
terms of permitted or suppressed expression) as it relates to the number of recorded hate crimes
per year. Other methods, including experimental approaches, would likely be less useful because
this research is ultimately intertwined with an entire country’s cultural development over an
extensive period of time. Despite the benefits of that research design, the organic development of
a holistic culture over a century cannot be replicated in an experimental setting. The advantage of
doing a historical observational analysis is that it is accurately impacted by cultural development.
To chart these patterns throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, I qualitatively analyzed
data from the Supreme Court’s written decision reasonings from major Supreme Court cases
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dating from 1919 to 2019. This data is from the Seventh Edition of the University Casebook
Series “First Amendment Law” (Feldman and Sullivan 2019). I selected 75 landmark cases
considered by experts in the field to demonstrate the evolution of court doctrine over the past
century, then randomly selected 50 cases from that list to analyze. I created a Free Speech Index
to categorically rank the cases by answering ten questions about each ruling (see Figure 1). The
Free Speech Index establishes a scale to measure each ruling’s level of illiberal expression
restriction based on the relative dangers presented by the constitutional question in each case.
The scale ranges from 0% representing complete totalitarian rule to 100% representing free
speech absolutism. In order to avoid ranking all restricted speech overly close to 0%, the
measurement assesses the facts of the cases as well as the Court’s reasoning for the ruling, rather
than just the ruling itself.
Since my focus is on the speech examined by the Supreme Court, I began with the
premise that the majority of expression not challenged in court is permitted, and the speech
restricted by ranking entities of the criminal justice system follows the guidelines outlined by
these court rulings.2 Thus, the starting position for measurement was 100% as unrestricted
speech equates to free speech absolutism, and the fullness of that absolutism is diminished by
rulings restricting the extent of free speech. Restrictions upon the liberty of expression bring the
parameters of legal public expression closer to totalitarianism, measured at 0%.
The index questions were designed to cover a wide typography of free speech cases.
More questions target punished speech than permitted speech since cases which permit speech
can only reduce free speech absolutism when the Court alludes to the possibility of speech
restriction in related circumstances (which may have created a chilling effect on future speech).
Three questions have a potential to raise a case’s score to reflect when a ruling contains caveats
that alleviate the damage of the speech restriction or restricted speech because it was
demonstrably necessary to ensure the liberties of others (see Figure 1).
It is important to note the potential for personal bias in this examination. The questions I
asked were designed to solicit a clear response, but the cases they are applied to can be argued to
emphasize a diverse array of interests. For example, Question 4 asks, “Are there other routes for
2

I acknowledge this assumption presumes the idealized enactment of the criminal justice system’s procedures, and
there are likely many incidents where speech has been restricted or punished despite the Court having previously
ruled to permit such expression. If speech is limited without Court record or outside of the Court’s ruled allowances,
it does not have a marked effect on the documented interpretation of the First Amendment in law overtime.
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communicating this message?” Yet, what exactly makes an alternative route of communication
less effective? The answer to this question is necessarily subjective, but the methods of this
analysis demanded I employed conscious judgement to put aside individual preferences and use
the information in the holdings, concurrences, and dissents to come to the most balanced
conclusion between the different arguments.
Figure 1: Free Speech Index Questions
Free Speech Index
If speech is punished or prohibited…
1. Is the idea contained in the speech unpopular
or disliked by the government? (Yes -10%)
(To some -5%) (No, unstated or unclear 0%)
2. Is the asserted harm of the speech…
(Unlikely? -15%) (Possible? -10%) (Present
and petty -5%) (Present and significant -2%)
3. Is there a legitimate, substantial, or
immediate danger presented by permitting
the speech? (No -10%) (Maybe -5%) (Yes
0%)
4. Are there other routes for communicating this
message? (No obvious alternatives -10%)
(Less effective, accessible, or compromised
alternatives -5%) (Bountiful alternatives
+5%)
5. Is the speech restricted despite there being no
infringement on the liberties or rights of
another? (Yes -15%) (Unclear 0%) (Someone
else’s liberties or rights were at risk +3%)
(No, someone else’s liberties or rights were
infringed upon +5%) (No, someone else’s
liberties or rights were severely infringed
upon +10%)

6. Does the ruling clearly risk having a chilling
effect on the breadth of future speech? (Yes
-10%) (Maybe or to a slight degree 0%) (No
+10%)
7. Is the speech political or politicized? (Yes
-10%) (Indirectly -5%) (No 0%)
8. Does the ruling not consider an act of “pure
speech” (traditionally written or verbal) and
criminalize a particular act of symbolic
speech that was intended as expression from
protection? (Yes -10%) (Potentially -5%) (No
or N/A 0%)
9. Does the ruling involve obscenity or similar
categories and restrict what types of content
or information available to consenting
adults? (Yes -10%) (Somewhat, but there is
other similar content available -5%) (No or
N/A 0%)
If speech is permitted…
10. Are there other speech restrictions in the
ruling such as hypotheticals or alluded
judgement on related issues that may have a
chilling effect on future speech or
expression? (Yes, greatly -15%) (Yes -10%)
(Yes, but they are narrow, well-defined, and
necessary to ensure a significant public
interest -5%) (No or N/A 0%)

The dependent variable measured the annual number of hate crimes committed
throughout the past century in the United States from 1918-2018. Hate crime victimization is
measured as the people victimized to hate crimes each year during this period. This includes a
broad range of crimes, such as simple and aggravated assault, intimidation, murder, rape, arson,
and destruction of property, among others. Incidents which were not criminalized or convicted
were included if the action committed constitutes any of these illegal crimes, and if they were
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perceived by the victim or historians to be bias-motivated due to the recorded context of the
assault.
The most prominent confound in this study is the deficient historical record of hate
crimes. Unfortunately, the FBI federal database for hate crimes from the FBI only traces back to
1992 and is limited in scope to hate crimes reported to and recorded by the police. Before the
Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990, “hate crimes were lumped together with such offenses as
homicide, assault, rape, robbery, and arson” (American Psychological Association, 1998).
Additionally, the term “hate crime” has only been in common usage since the 1980s (Office of
Justice Programs, 2021). In order to compensate for these limitations, I aggregated data reporting
United States’ hate crime victimization using a large conglomerate of data sources recording
prejudice-motivated violence from 1918-2018. Sources included FBI Hate Crime Statistics,
Bureau of Justice Statistics from the National Crime Victimization Survey, the Anti-Defamation
League, the Tuskegee University Lynching Archives, BlackPast.org, various books, and local
newspapers. Due to the severe impact of this confound on the results of this study, the
implications of this data deficiency are expanded upon in this article’s discussion.
I compared the available data from both variables by arranging their findings on temporal
graphs, one depicting the evolution of Supreme Court free speech rulings over the past century,
and the other depicting my collected record of hate crimes committed over that same century
(Figures 2 and 4). From here, I analyzed the connections between the data and drew conclusions
about the relationship between the two variables. Finally, I explored plausible explanations for
the findings to examine the relationship between tolerance for free speech in law and a nation’s
tendency for hate crimes.
These methods do not permit me to make causal claims given the observational and
necessarily somewhat subjective nature of this study. This research is nonetheless useful because
it offers a detailed examination of the United States from a historical perspective, providing a
wealth of information about the expression of American cultural dynamics in liberty, tolerance,
and violence through the 20th and 21st century. In political science, this research speaks to the
function of free speech in society and effectiveness of the United States’ approach to balancing
the tensions between civil liberties and civil rights. Additionally, it presents considerations for
interpreting the historical account of hate crime records and complicates the image of the state’s
role in maintaining social hierarchy in society.
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Analysis
Supreme Court Cases
The data from the Supreme Court case analysis produces a clear trend of the Court’s
liberalization in its First Amendment free speech interpretation. The analysis begins in 1919 as it
was not common for the Court to meaningfully address the First Amendment before the
Incorporation Doctrine--which necessitated that state laws do not violate the First
Amendment--was announced in 1925 by the Gitlow v. New York ruling.
The court cases’ index scores’ upper limit trends indicate the Court’s willingness over
time to allow controversial speech. The lower limit trends indicate the Court’s willingness over
time to flirt with totalitarian, arbitrary restriction of unpopular speech. By a linear equation, both
the upper and lower limit liberalized at a similar rate. Meaning, among cases the Court ruled in
favor of free speech, they became more willing to rule in ways which were permissive to a wider
array of circumstances and views. Simultaneously, in cases restricting speech, the Court grew
less willing to allow government to suppress speech over time without conditioning the ruling
and/or giving well founded explanation for the ruling (commonly characterized by a judicial
Figure 2: Free Speech Liberalization in the U.S. Supreme Court, 1919-2019
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balance between competing interests). As time progressed, the Court developed a stronger norm
against extremely totalitarian rulings suppressing free speech. Further, it ruled increasingly in
favor of controversial speech. The average index scores indicate that overtime, the court more
frequently ruled to allow controversial or contested speech while also ruling less frequently to
restrict speech without objective and substantial reason(s) (see Figure 2; full analyses and
scoring of individual cases are available in Appendix C).
Indeed, the most transitional year for the Court’s increases in free speech liberalism is
1969. That year, the case rulings flip from most cases scoring below the total average case index
score of the entire measured history to most cases scoring above that mean score (see Figure 3).
This judicial flip may have been a response to the turbulent events of 1968, a year considered by
historians to be uniquely transformative, given the degraded public support for the Vietnam War
Figure 3: Interpretation of Free Speech Liberalization in the U.S. Supreme Court, 1919-2019
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after the Tet Offensive, Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassination, the Columbia University revolt,
the assassination of Robert F. Kennedy, the clash between protestors and police outside of the
Democratic National Convention in Chicago, and more (Isserman & Kazin, 2015). The Court
dataset did not measure a case from 1968, but the three cases measured in 1969 began a era of
markedly more tolerant rulings on controversial ideas.
Hate Crime Victimization
The data from hate crime victimization was erratic and demonstrated a steep increase in
the number of reported hate crimes starting in 1980. Additionally, the reported victimizations
surged dramatically from 2003-2015 due to the availability of more encompassing hate crime
reports from the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ National Crime Victimization Survey (note the
broken scale in Figure 4). The FBI data recorded ranged from 1991 to 2018 and did not depict
any significant trends when it was isolated from the other data sources (see Appendix E for
graph of FBI Hate Crime Victimization data). There is a gap in the data from 1969 to 1972, and
1974 to 1976, where I was unable to locate any hate crime reports. The vast majority of the data
from the first half of the century (1918-1968) is from the Tuskegee University lynching archives.
This is supplemented by detailed accounts of race riots as reported by BlackPast.org. In
interpreting this data, it is important to note that the United States population more than tripled
between 1918 and 2018, growing from 103.2 million to 327.2 million (U.S. Census Bureau,
1919; 2019). See Figure 4 for total recorded annual victimizations.
The results of this variable were highly dependent upon the sources available and the
emergent attention hate crimes gained over the past century. The increase in the number of hate
crimes reported starting in 1980 directly correlates to when the term “hate crime” entered the
common vernacular. The records prior were not collected by the government, but by advocacy
groups and academics. In total, only scarce historical records were obtainable. Presumably, most
hate crimes went unreported during this period due to the culture of the time. Up until 1963, the
records exclusively tabulate lynching and riot-intwined hate crimes committed against Black
Americans. Since 1964, the recorded hate crimes expanded to include victimizations of gay and
lesbian people, Jewish people, and finally a broad range of groups once the government began
official annual collections of hate crime statistics.

18
Figure 4: Annual Recorded Hate Crime Victims in the United States, 1918-2018
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The reporting entities produced very different ranges of reported incidents because they
had different resources available for creating their data sets, they varied by the population, crime,
locale, and/or time period organizations were attempting to record, and groups attempting to
record all hate crimes against a population differed how they determined an incident qualified as
a “hate crime.” For example, the Bureau of Justice Statistics included crimes reported to the
police and unreported crimes "perceived by the victims to be bias-motivated because the
offender used hate language or left behind hate symbols'' (Langton, 2017) and some advocacy
groups report unconfirmed incidents from anonymous sources. Meanwhile, the FBI only records
convicted crimes reported to and recorded by the police, many police departments do not
participate in hate crime data collection, and hate crimes are commonly underreported by victims
(FBI Uniform Crime Report, 2018; Department of Justice, 1997).
The distinction between major historical events of racial violence in the first and second
half of the 20th century is prominently between the acting capacity of the people inflicting
violence upon Black Americans. The first half of the century’s racial violence was marked by the
tendency toward brutal “race riots,” in which towns across the country would intermittently be
provoked into anarchical race-based violence. These riots could last days and were
predominantly characterized by white towns men banning together to assault and murder Black
townspeople, frequently burning their homes and destroying their property in the process. Black
townspeople defended themselves by fighting back, and frequently became homeless or left
town. For example, a notable race riot in 1923 resulted in the complete desertion of the Florida
town Rosewood, in Levy County. After rumors had spread to nearby white communities of Black
on white violence, a group of 200 white men from surrounding towns attacked the Black
residents of Rosewood, slaughtered their animals, and burned all but two buildings in the town
(BlackPast.org, 2021; History, 2020; the Washington Post, 1993;).
While the race riots of the first half of the first half of the century were characterized by
white civilian violence, the racial violence within “urban uprisings'' of the century’s second half
was committed by police officers. The apparent stagnation of racially based violence from
1950-1980 should not be attributed to an actual stagnation of violence. Rather, this reported
stagnation is merely a result of the legalization of racial violence via its execution through
officials operating in their state-sanctioned capacity. White violence was committed within white
peoples’ capacity as individuals during the first half of the century, and in uniform during the
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second half of the century. This is not to say that white actors were convicted for racial violence
before 1950; race riots commonly resulted in the arrests of Black people, not white people, and
often for unspecified reasons.
Although I was not able to create a holistic account of the total annual hate crimes
committed over the past century, the data represents an account of the hate crimes recorded over
the past century, albeit likely an incomplete account. The deficiencies in the accessible data
demonstrate several important conclusions about the intertwinement of data collection, history,
and culture. Particularly before the digital age, the examination of history by today’s moral
standards is bordered by the tendency of the hegemonic group to collect data merely as it
resonates with their interests and ideas of what is important to remember. History is ultimately
recorded and reframed through a multitude of lenses as time goes on, but when records of who
was assaulted in a particular town in 1943 were never created, there is no way to retrieve
knowledge about the lost events of the past. The historical record is filtered through the people
present on that day, the culture the history occurred in, culture and historians of the past, and the
culture and historians of the present. Since it was likely commonplace and morally justified for
white men to degrade women, people of color, and LGBT people, it is not incongruent that no
collective effort was made to write down the number of these people hurt on a given day (or if
anyone did, that those records are submerged).
Discussion
My theoretical expectations predicted that as more speech became legally permitted by
the federal court, the tendency for hate crimes to be committed in a country would decrease. The
aggregate hate crime data clearly reveals an increase in the number of hate crimes recorded over
the past century even though the data was extraordinarily erratic due to resource availability and
significant discrepancies between the data collection methods of primary sources. Given that
many hate crimes were not initially interpreted as crimes in the early 20th century, were not
categorically separated from other crimes in the mid-20th century, and were not labeled as “hate
crimes'' until the 1980s, the increase in the number of recorded hate crime victimizations is not
substantial evidence to conclude that the nation’s actual propensity for hate crimes increased
over the past century; rather, the data implies that the national tendency to record hate crimes
increased. Additionally, priority differences between U.S. government, historians, and advocacy
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groups manifest in strikingly distinct methods of hate crime data collection. As time progressed
the national culture became increasingly concerned with the salience of documenting and
addressing the violence committed against minorities, most notably in the past 40 years.
Additional research could undertake the task of creating a more complete account of hate crimes
committed in the 20th century, however this is likely an impossible task. Simply put, it is hard to
find hate crime data because the dominant culture--specifically white people in America--did not
find hate crimes notable enough to record. The best records of the early 20th century in this
research was Black historians’ records of people victimized by race riots and lynchings. Those
records are distant from the surface of the internet.
This hollowed record of history speaks directly to my theory--hegemonic ideology
discounts the experiences of those it oppresses. While word of a Black man raping white women
was cause for newspaper articles, lynchings, devastatingly deadly race riots--historical records of
white men raping Black women is eerily vacant (Equal Justice Initiative, 2017). During this time
people were pressured to heed to social hierarchy and certainly, leave it unchallenged. The only
recorded violence against oppressed people was publicized violence intended to broadcast the
reprimandation of minorities suspected of challenging the hegemonic ideology. The violent
execution and arson of Black communities were published in newspapers because the
intimidation-laden publicity was advantageous for maintaining racial hierarchy and contributed
to the legitimization of hegemony. In the early 20th century, challenging the dominant ideology
resulted in violent social condemnation. Oppositional speech did not see great prospect in the
Court either.
This half of the 20th century was not a period of vibrant free speech. In this study, all of
the Supreme Court rulings from 1919-1957 permitted government to restrict speech it found
harmful or potentially harmful.3 The most immediately present harm in any of the cases
restricting free speech was in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942), which ruled to punish
Chaplinsky’s offensive, peace-disturbing speech using a New Hampshire law against
“address(ing) any offensive, derisive, or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in
any street or other public place, nor call(ing) him by any offensive or derisive name [emphasis
added].” This and the other non-sedition case in this time period ruled against challenges to

3

Nine cases were measured during this 38-year time period. This is largely because there were less free speech cases
which actually were deliberated in the Supreme Court during this time period.
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religious norms. Socially and legally, speech was silenced because it stood in opposition to
hegemony.
My research further implies that the patterns of socially and legally enforced silence are
motivated to maintain a lack of opposition to the hegemonic ideology in public dialogue. This
has serious implications for the prospect of legal hate speech restrictions. Consider how other
restrictions on free speech were justified. Sedition cases, as one prominent example, argued that
some political beliefs were so dangerous to the continuation of organized government that they
must be extinguished (Schenck v. U.S., Abrams v. U.S., Gitlow v. NY, Whitney v. CA). Yet, the
expression in these cases was relatively harmless to government preservation, given that the
expression occurred without provoking government overthrow.
For example, in the Whitney v. California ruling Justice Stanford writes, “A state may
punish those who abuse freedom of speech by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending
to [...] endanger the foundations of organized government and threaten to overthrow by unlawful
means” (1927). While it may seem reasonable to argue that a government has a right to
self-preservation, let us examine the cost in this particular instance. This case convicts a woman
for being a part of a group seeking political change. The group considered the possibility of
unlawful means to obtain political change, but the woman urged the group against illegal action.
She was convicted for being a part of a group that had pondered the idea. While a government
may have a right to self-preservation, if the legitimacy of democratic government rests in the
public’s consent to be governed, a liberal democracy creates risky internal contradictions by
extinguishing legitimate political deliberation. This case is not an anomaly; many other cases
during this time period similarly restricted unpopular speech by the Bad Tendency rational
(despite some Justices’ attempts to frame their use of this doctrine as the Clear and Present
Danger doctrine.4) Many of these rulings effectively criminalized publicly relevant viewpoints
the government opposed.
The compelling arguments for hate speech laws should not be accepted without
considering that arguments for far-reaching sedition laws were also compelling. Both arguments
demonize a group with an unpopular opinion and prophesize tragic consequences if that group is
able to continue expressing their ideas. It is not my argument that hate speech is not degrading to
the health and well-being of targeted minorities, nor is this harm unimportant. Instead, I forewarn
4

Herbeck & Tedford, 2017
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that legitimizing government’s authority to suppress expression--whether it be seditious speech
or derogatory speech--allows government to determine which speech, ideas, and speakers are
permissible, and punish those which are not. Government is not immune from acting unjustly, as
it is made up by a body of people guided by their own perceptions of the world, as well as their
motivation to remain in power5 by pleasing whoever keeps them in power.
The data from the second half of the 20th century and the 21st century demonstrate a
dramatic increase in the breadth of legally expressible ideas. Free speech cases during this time
period shift away from considering if government should allow unpopular speech, towards
balancing conflicting interests and liberties between citizens, organizations, and local, state and
federal government. For example, Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston (1995) considered whether private organizers of a publicly held St. Patrick’s Day Parade
must allow the Boston GLIB Group to not only join the parade, but be their own unit in the
parade with an identifying banner when a state law forbade discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation in places of public accommodation. In this case, the Court determined that the private
group putting on the parade has a right to portray whatever message they sought to communicate
by the parade. The GLIB members were not excluded from participating in the parade as
individuals, nor was their message blocked as they could have put on their own parade. While a
disadvantaged minority was ruled against in this case, the ruling does not silence minority
expression in society, and it is well justified by a balance of competing interests.
The Court’s trend of restricting expression by less arbitrary factors during the late 20th
and 21st century is demonstrated by the rising lower limit of case index scores. Rather than
punishing speech because it challenged the dominant ideology and caused offense (e.g. Feiner v.
New York, 1951), the Court gravitated towards less hegemonically motivated rulings,
implementing an expansive vision of free speech extending even towards expression
aggressively opposed the dominant culture (e.g. Texas v. Johnson, 1989). Alongside the
increased national tendency to collect hate crime data near this time period, these trends are
indicative of cultural change. Not only did the media begin to report on hate crime activity in the
1970s, activist groups began to collect hate crime data as they occurred during the 1980s, and the
government began collecting national statistics on hate crimes in the 1990s. Culture grew more
cognizant of and vocal about the experiences of oppressed people in society, likely via increasing
5

Or minimally, by their motivation to avoid harassment, violence, or remorse after holding office;
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racial diversity, expanding national communication with technological advancement, and the
momentum of successive activism movements6 (Sandefur et al., 2001). Social movement after
social movement, the veil of hegemony weakened as people throughout the nation continued to
discuss how the dominant culture promoted inequality and oppression.
Yet, hegemony is not gone. Rather, the scope and framework of dominant ideology has
shifted. For example, much of the data collected from the first half of the century is from
contemporary advocacy groups and scholars who have pieced together historical records of the
hate-events they were interested in (lynchings and race riots). However, the critical question
remains: who is being left out? Acts of anti-Asian racism prompted by the global COVID-19
pandemic have promoted public consideration of the historical narrative, or rather lack thereof,
of anti-Asian racism. While mainstream culture has overarching narratives shaping our
understanding of what happened to Black Americans over the past century (although incomplete
or biasly framed histories), we lack such a cohesive and accessible narrative of the experiences
of racism of Asian Americans, and certainly many other minorities. Instead, the “model
minority” stereotype (a product of hegemony) has contributed to the tendency to discount and
underemphasize Asian Americans’ experiences of racism and discrimination (Abdollah &
Hughes, 2021; Hsu, 2021). The fact that historical accounts of racist violence have only been
contemporarily reconstructed of some minority groups but not others indicates how
contemporary society emphasizes the discrimination experienced by some groups more than
others. The point here is not to compare the plights of oppression, rather to direct our attention to
the biases ubiquitously integrated within our current culture, similar to America’s cultural past.
While locating numerically accurate accounts of incidents of racist violence overtime may be a
cumbersome or impossible task, a more effective way to address and placate current biases in
society semantically by constructing and disseminating emotionally compelling narratives of the
histories and current experiences of unacknowledged discrimination. Allowing narratives that
perpetuate prejudice to go un-countered not only biases the public to disregard truly
discriminatory structures and behaviors, but also creates an illusion of false consensus--allowing
prejudice to remain unrecognized (Westen, 2007).

6

I.e. Civil rights movement, Black Lives Matter; 1st, 2nd and 3rd wave feminism, #MeToo; Indigenous rights; Gay,
trans and queer rights; Immigration activism; Criminal justice reform; Occupy movement; Climate strikes; etc.
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Additionally, minorities’ oppression no longer takes the form of normalized public
violence, but is manifested as state sponsored (or condoned) violence and structural inequality
which promotes their disadvantage in poorly moderated capitalism. While there is certainly less
stigma around discussing the realities of oppression, the stigma is still present. The power of a
hegemonic ideology is its elusive ability to transgress criticism by naturalizing itself into the
structure of collective thought. Violations of human liberty are predominantly excused when they
are introduced through the weavings of the dominant ideological framework, as it is convenient
for those in power. This framework allows us to better explain the U.S. government’s pattern of
committing or condoning oppression throughout history with little immediate backlash (e.g.
slavery, forced migration of Native Americans, restricting women’s right to participate in public
society, child labor, Jim Crow laws, Japanese internment camps, segregation, red-lining, sodomy
laws, mass incarceration, police brutality, discriminatory TSA procedures, refusing to regulate
capitalism, mass internet surveillance, etc.). Rather than focusing exclusively on the relationship
between the legal restriction of free speech and societal desensitization to civilian hate crimes,
the scope ought to broaden to acknowledge the State’s influential role in enacting, perpetuating,
and creating prejudice norms specifically, though its manifestation as hate crimes of the State.
Conclusion
This research sought to investigate the relationship between the United States’ approach
to balancing the interests between the liberty of individual expression and the oppression of
minorities through civilian hate crimes. I theorized that hegemonic ideology has a more
influential and violent manifestation in society when speech is legally restricted because a
government is most likely to restrict speech opposing the dominant ideology. To investigate this
puzzle, I assessed and scored the relative liberalism of 50 U.S. Supreme Court freedom of
expression case rulings throughout the past century. During this same time period, I collected as
much data as feasible within the practical limitations of this project to chart the number of
reported hate crimes from 1918 to 2018.
The Supreme Court rulings showed a clear trend of liberalization in the rulings, while the
number of reported hate crimes over the same century increased dramatically—contradicting my
hypothesis that the liberalization of legal free speech would be associated with a decrease in hate
crime victimization. While my findings are unable to support my hypothesis, based on the
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significant lack of hate crime data recorded before 1970 and the nature of the scarce data
acquired from 1919 to that point, I argue that the relatively minuscule record of hate crimes
recorded during this time period is not a result of the actual rate of victimization, but reflects
society’s normalization of and desensitization to violence against minorities. Given my research
design and methodological approach, these findings are not necessarily generalizable to other
countries with different histories and levels of diversity, immigration, and systemic inequality. To
account for this, future research could investigate the effects of speech laws on more
homogeneous countries and countries presently employing harsh speech restriction. Given
government’s demonstrated tendency to more arbitrarily restrict speech via the dominant
ideology’s values, hate speech laws may result in serious infringements upon minority rights.
This research implies the State has a critical role in maintaining hegemony in society. The
United States’ progression from intolerance in legal rulings parallels an increased cultural
legitimacy granted to minorities’ voices and experiences. When government suppression of
expression it deems impermissible by hypothetical and improbable reasoning is within societal
norms, government too frequently rules in alliance with Mill’s tyranny of the majority. To use an
analogy, when the light of communication is always filtered through a red lens, it can be difficult
to see and understand green. Stifled communication likely promotes a more hospitable
environment for prejudice attitudes, whether that be in the form of legally and socially enforced
hegemony--or in technological advancements. It is difficult to untangle the United States’
progression of tolerant attitudes with the progression of technological advancement. Technology
has facilitated national and global communication, contributing to the ability to share ideas and
stories across expansive spatial divides. But today brings us new challenges as technology
becomes the source of its own rapidly changing cultures, complete with dark corners which
welcome prejudice itself. Is digital liberty somehow different than non-digital liberty? And what
of the increasing role of private companies in moderating digital speech? Much is left to address.
Given the volatile nature of politics in a technologically advanced age, future research
ought to investigate the rhetoric of the cultural and political landscapes, and their relationship to
minority oppression. Additionally, it is also important for scholars to investigate the impact of
government implemented human rights violations on the free-flow of speech in society. This line
of research would likely reveal some necessary but depressing realities about the intersection of
free speech and the violence against oppressed communities throughout the international system.
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Appendix B
Free Speech Index
If speech is punished or prohibited…
1. Is the idea contained in the speech unpopular or disliked by the government? (Yes -10%)
(To some -5%) (No, unstated or unclear 0%)
2. Is the asserted harm of the speech… (Unlikely? -15%) (Possible? -10%) (Present and
petty -5%) (Present and significant -2%)
3. Is there a legitimate, substantial, immediate danger presented by permitting the speech?
(No -10%) (Maybe -5%) (Yes 0%)
4. Are there other routes for communicating this message? (No obvious alternatives -10%)
(Less effective, accessible, or compromised alternatives -5%) (Bountiful alternatives
+5%)
5. Is the speech restricted despite there being no infringement on the liberties or rights of
another? (Yes -15%) (Unclear 0%) (Someone else’s liberties or rights were at risk +3%)
(No, someone else’s liberties or rights were infringed upon +5%) (No, someone else’s
liberties or rights were severely infringed upon +10%)
6. Does the ruling clearly risk having a chilling effect on the breadth of future speech? (Yes
-10%) (Maybe or to a slight degree 0%) (No +10%)
7. Is the speech political or politicized? (Yes -10%) (Indirectly -5%) (No 0%)
8. Does the ruling not consider an act of “pure speech” (traditionally written or verbal) and
criminalize a particular act of symbolic speech that was intended as expression from
protection? (Yes -10%) (Potentially -5%) (No or N/A 0%)
9. Does the ruling involve obscenity or similar categories and restrict what types of content
or information available to consenting adults? (Yes -10%) (Somewhat, but there is other
similar content available -5%) (No or N/A 0%)
If speech is permitted…
10. Are there other speech restrictions in the ruling such as hypotheticals or alluded
judgement on related issues that may have a chilling effect on future speech or
expression? (Yes, greatly -15%) (Yes -10%) (Yes, but they are narrow, well-defined, and
necessary to ensure a significant public interest -5%) (No or N/A 0%)
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Appendix C
Case Analyses
1. Schenck v. US (1919)
FACTS: Schenck produced mailing pamphlets encouraging people to resist the draft during war
with Germany during WWI. He was charged with three charges: a conspiracy to cause
insubordination and obstruct military recruitment during war time, a conspiracy to use USPS for
a legally nonmailable document, and actually unlawfully using the mail to transmit the
pamphlets. All courts found the defendants guilty.
Ruling: By the Sedition Act, citizens do not have a right to advocate against the government
during times of war with the intent to generate insubordination and obstruct military recruitment.
The government can interfere potentially dangerous speech before it has an opportunity to
become effective. A person is liable for the intended effect of speech independent of if the actual
obstruction took place.
INDEX: 1-yes (-10%), 2-possible (-10%), 3-no (-10%), 4-no obvious alternatives (-10%),
5-unclear (0%), 6-yes (-10%), 7-yes (-10%), 8-n/a (0%), 9-n/a (0%), 10-n/a (0%). Score: 40%
2. Abrams v. US (1919)
FACTS: During WWI, the USSR and Germany signed a peace treaty which prompted the US to
send troops into the Soviet Union with the intent to “crush the Russian Revolution.” A small
group of Russian Immigrants produced two leaflets, one English, one Yiddish, which they
distributed in and around NYC encouraging workers to go on a general strike to stop producing
the ammunition which was being sent to US troops in Russia. The US government prosecuted
them under the Sedition Act under the claim that their leaflets would compromise the possibility
of US victory in the war against Germany. The trial court sentenced them to 20 years in prison.
Ruling: By the Sedition Act, citizens cannot produce and distribute publications protesting the
government’s actions during wartime if the government perceives it to have the potential to
interfere with the production of necessary resources essential to war. The Court determined the
defendants had the intent to excite civil unrest during wartime for the purpose of embarrassing
and potentially defeating military plans.
INDEX: 1-yes (-10%), 2-Unlikely (-15%), 3-no (-10%), 4-no obvious alternatives (-10%), 5-yes
(-15%), 6-yes (-10%), 7-yes (-10%), 8-n/a (0%), 9-n/a (0%), 10-n/a (0%). Score: 20%
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3. Gitlow v. NY (1925)
FACTS: Gitlow produced and distributed “The Left-Wing Manifesto” and published and
distributed the writings of that manifesto in a paper called “The Revolutionary Age.” While the
document called for action into a Communist Revolution, no such action took place. Gitlow was
charged with the statutory crime of criminal anarchy according to the New York Penal Law.
Ruling: The 1st Amendment was not violated by Gitlow’s conviction under the New York Penal
Law. Unlike previous rulings, the Clear and Present Danger doctrine does not apply because the
State has a right to self-preservation against intent to violently and unlawfully overthrow
organized government. “Utterances advocating the overthrow of organized government by force,
violence and unlawful means, are so inimical to the general welfare and involve such danger of
substantive evil that they may be penalized in the exercise of its police power.”
INDEX: 1-yes (-10%), 2-Unlikely (-15%), 3-no (-10%), 4-no obvious alternatives (-10%), 5-yes
(-15%), 6-yes (-10%), 7-yes (-10%), 8-n/a (0%), 9-n/a (0%), 10-n/a (0%). Score: 20%
4. Whitney v. CA (1927)
FACTS: Whitney was convicted under the Criminal Syndicalism Act of California for organizing
and being a member of a group that intended to effect political change and industrial ownership
or control. Whitney argued that her intention in being a part of the Communist Labor Part was
not to promote illegal action to obtain their political goals, rather she had spoken out in favor of
action via lawful measures. The defendant claimed the Act violated her 1st Amendment rights
via the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.
Ruling: Whitney’s conviction did not violate the free speech or due process. “A state may punish
those who abuse freedom of speech by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to incite
crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger the foundations of organized government and
threaten to overthrow by unlawful means” (Justice Stanford). Given that Whitney had joined and
furthered the existence of an organization which sought to “menace the peace and welfare of the
state,” the court found there was not an unreasonable exercise of police power.
INDEX: 1-yes (-10%), 2-possible (-10%), 3-no (-10%), 4-less effective or compromised
alternatives (-5%), 5-unclear (0%), 6-yes (-10%), 7-yes (-10%), 8-n/a (0%), 9-n/a (0%), 10-n/a
(0%). Score: 45%
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5. Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940)
FACTS: Jehovah’s Witnesses attacked public school regulations requiring students to salute the
flag and recite the pledge of allegiance. They alleged it went against their religion.
Ruling: The mandatory flag salute did not infringe upon religious and speech liberties protected
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. National unity is the basis of national security. The
state has a right to select the appropriate means for its attainment and is a substantial government
interest in comparison to things like littered streets. The court declined to make itself, “the school
board of the country.” The secular regulation rule was applied which holds that secular
exceptions cannot be granted for non-religious government actions or rules.
INDEX: 1-yes (-10%), 2-Unlikely (-15%), 3-no (-10%), 4-bountiful alternatives (+5%), 5-yes
(-15%), 6-yes (-10%), 7-yes (-10%), 8-yes (-10%), 9-n/a (0%), 10-n/a (0%). Score: 25%
6. Chaplinsky v. NH (1942)
FACTS: Chaplinsky, a Jehovah’s Witness, generated disturbance on the street of a “restless”
crowd by denouncing all religion as “racket.” He was taken aside by a police officer and the two
of them encountered the City Marshal, who Chaplinsky then called a “God damned racketeer,”
“a damned Fascist,” and proclaimed that “the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or
agents of Fascists.” This violated a New Hampshire state law that no person “shall address any
offensive derisive or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other
public place, nor call him by any offensive or derisive name.”
Ruling: The New hampshire law did not violate freedom of speech. Offensive speech that is
likely to provoke violence or cause a breach of peace is not protected. Such speech is categorized
as “fighting words,” which are face-to-face words plainy likely to “men of common
intelligence...to cause an average addressee to fight.” Such speech is not an “essential part of any
exposition of ideas” and does not have a “social value” such as a “step to truth” which outweighs
the “social interest in order and morality.”
INDEX: 1-yes (-10%), 2-present and petty (-5%), 3-maybe (-5%), 4-bountiful alternatives
(+5%), 5-yes (-15%), 6-yes (-10%), 7-yes (-10%), 8-n/a (0%), 9-n/a (0%), 10-n/a (0%).
Score: 50%
7. NAACP v. AL (1958)
FACTS: Alabama sought to prevent the NAACP from doing business in the state. After the
circuit court issued a restraining order, the state issued a subpoena for various records which

41
included demanding the NAACP reveal the names and addresses of all of its Alabama members
and agents. The NAACP refused on the grounds that the state cannot constitutionally compel
disclosure.
Ruling: Alabama’s requirement for the advocacy group NAACP to disclose the names and
addresses of its members was in violation of the 1st Amendment freedom of speech and
assembly and in violation of the 14th Amendment right to due process. Maintaining member
confidentiality is so related to the freedom of assembly that it is necessary to ensure immunity
from state scrutiny when conducting lawful activity. Freedom to assemble in groups dedicated to
advancing a belief or ideology is inseparable from the due process clause. Disclosing the
membership of the NAACP would likely result in an interference with the freedom of
association, therefore the states interest in maintaining the records is not sufficient to supersede
the group members constitutional rights. Freedom to associate with organizations that advance
beliefs and ideas is inseparable from the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause.
INDEX: 1-9 n/a (0%), 10-no (0%). Score: 100%
8. Dennis v. US (1951)
FACTS: During the McCarthy Era, several petitioners were convicted in trial by jury for
violating the conspiracy provisions of the Smith Act of 1940 for having a conspiracy to
overthrow the government by willingly organizing as a group to advocate and teach violent
government overthrow. The defendants were teaching four books which “advocated the
overthrow of our Government by force and violence.” The defendants claimed their 1st
Amendment rights of free speech and assembly were violated by the Smith Act.
Ruling: Vinson wrote the opinion of the court by arguing that in the Clear and Probable Danger
doctrine, conspiring and teaching for the violent overthrow of government during the time of the
Cold War serves as an imminent danger. He argued that the government is not forced to wait
until the moment when the call to action to overthrow is made to prosecute, as that would not be
practical. The existence of the conspiracy to organize for violent government overthrow is a
danger to the continuance of organized government.
INDEX: 1-yes (-10%), 2-Unlikely (-15%), 3-no (-10%), 4-no obvious alternatives (-10%),
5-unclear (0%), 6-yes (-10%), 7-yes (-10%), 8-n/a (0%), 9-n/a (0%), 10-n/a (0%). Score: 35%
9. Feiner v. NY (1951)
FACTS: Feiner gave a speech on a street corner stating that Black Americans do not have equal
rights and “should rise up in arms and fight for them.” The crowd was bi-racial and gathered
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75-80 people; it was spilling out into the street and the speech “stirred up a little excitement,”
and “some pushing, shoving, and milling around.” After about 20 minutes, an audience member
said “If you don’t get that son of a bitch off, I will go over and get him off there myself” to an
observing police officer. The police officer requested Feiner stop speaking twice, Feiner ignored
the officer, and then the officer arrested Feiner. The report gave a disorderly conduct charge for
“ignoring and refusing to heed and obey reasonable police orders issued to regulate and control
said crowd and to prevent a breach of the peace and to prevent injuries to pedestrians attempting
to use said walk.”
Ruling: Feiner’s arrest for giving a speech which riled a crowd and could have produced a breach
of the peace was not in violation of his 1st Amendment rights. The arrest was reasonable because
the police officer was nervous of the possibility of riot. The arrest was not because of the content
of the speech, but rather to preserve peace given the audience’s response. He says a police officer
using arrest as an instrument to silence unpopular views is different from situations in which “the
speaker passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot.” The
defense was ruled valid due to (1) “the imminence of greater disorder and (2) “the deliberate
defiance of the police officers.”7
INDEX: 1-yes (-10%), 2-possible (-10%), 3-no (-10%)8, 4-less effective or compromised
alternatives (-5%), 5-yes (-15%)9, 6-maybe (0%), 7-yes (-10%), 8-n/a (0%), 9-n/a (0%), 10-n/a
(0%). Score: 40%
10. Roth v. US (1957)
FACTS: Roth was convicted under a federal obscenity law for mailing obscene advertising and
an obscene book.
Ruling: The federal obscenity law prohibiting the sale or transfer of obscenity through the mail
did not violate the 1st Amendment freedom of expression. Obscene material is not protected by
the 1st Amendment as it does not have redeeming social importance. Sex, being a great motive
force in human life is a matter of human interest and public concern. Obscenity on the other hand
may “perceptibly create a clear and present danger of antisocial conduct, or will probably induce
its recipients to such conduct (although the Court admits no evidence to support this claim is
7

Justice Black’s dissent in this case argued that the evidence presented would not suggest there was an imminent
danger of riot. The police officer’s actions were contrary to ordinary official duty to protect Feiner's constitutional
right to speak. The police officer could have protected Feiner’s right to speak and maintained social order and safety
by making an aisle in the sidewalk to keep pedestrians out of the street and spoken to or arrested the person
threatening the speaker. Finally, he disagrees that “deliberate defiance” to head to a police officer’s unexplained
request is warrant for arrest or customary practice.
8
The evidence presented to the Court would not suggest there was an imminent danger of riot.
9
People do not have a right to not be offended in public.
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provided in this case). Therefore, the “protection of freedom of speech and press for material
which does not treat sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest” is safeguarded from the
censorship of obscenity. The present test is “whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole,
appeals to prurient interest” and is utterly without redeeming social importance. The trial courts
sufficiently followed this standard and the laws did not fail to give adequate notice of what is
prohibited.
INDEX: 1-yes (-10%)10, 2-possible (-10%), 3-no (-10%)11, 4-no obvious alternatives (-10%),
5-no, someone else’s liberties or rights were infringed upon (+5%), 6-yes (-10%), 7-no (0%),
8-potentially (-5%), 9-yes (-10%), 10-n/a (0%). Score: 40%
11. Edwards v. South Carolina (1963)
FACTS: 187 Black student protesters were marching along the South Carolina State House
grounds holding signs that messaged “Down with Segregation.” A large crowd gathered, and
authorities ordered the protesters to disperse within 15 minutes. When they did not, they were
arrested.
Ruling: The protesters’ arrests were in violation of their 1st Amendment rights to assembly, to
the petition of grievances, and free speech along with their 14th Amendment due process rights.
There was no reason to restrain the protesters given no violence was present or being threatened
by the onlookers or the protestors. The 1st and 14th Amendment do not permit a State to
criminalize the peaceful expression of unpopular views.
INDEX: 1-9 n/a (0%), 10-yes (-10%)12. Score: 90%
12. Adderly v. FL (1966)
FACTS: A group of 32 students protested the arrest of other students the day before and to
demonstrate against racial segregation outside of a county jail on the jail’s premises. They were
at the jail entrance to begin and the county sheriff asked them to leave. They did not, but they did
10

Note the 1950s conservative mainstream attitude towards sexuality and the way the Court deems obscene material
to be lacking in redeeming social importance. Note the definition of “prurient” from Webster’s New International
Dictionary in 1949: “Itching; longing; uneasy with desire or longing of persons, having itching, morbid, or
lascivious longings; of desire, curiosity or propensity, lewd.”
11
Kutchinsky, B. (1973). The effect of easy availability of pornography on the incidence of sex crimes: The Danish
experience. Journal of Social Issues, 29(3), 163–181. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1973.tb00094.x
This study uses the Danish liberalization of pornography laws as a case study and finds “concurrent with the
increasing availability of pornography, there was a significant decrease in the number of sex offenses registered by
the police in Copenhagen.”
12
The holding implies non-peaceful protestors may be punished.
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move back from the jail entrance and remained in the driveway. They were convicted for
“trespass with a malicious and mischievous intent.”
Ruling: The students’ First Amendment Rights to petition the redress of grievances were not
violated by arresting and prosecuting them for trespassing onto the grounds of a county jail and
not leaving when asked. The record showed that the sheriff did not object to their cause, only to
their presence on the ground that “jail grounds are reserved for jail uses.” Given that no such
protest had happened before, it could conclude that the enforcement was evenhanded. Nothing in
the Constitution would prohibit the even handed enforcement against trespassing which
amounted to the curtilage of the jailhouse. The State has similar rights to property as a private
owner would when it comes to trespassing and “has the power to preserve the property under its
control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.”
INDEX: 1-yes (-10%), 2-possible (-10%), 3-no (-10%), 4-less effective or compromised
alternatives (-5%), 5-yes (-15%), 6-maybe or to a slight degree (0%), 7-yes (-10%), 8-n/a (0%),
9-n/a (0%), 10-n/a (0%). Score: 40%
13. Brandenburg v. OH (1969)
FACTS: During a TV broadcasted KKK rally where some members were holding weapons, one
KKK member gave a speech saying revenge on U.S. government might be possible if white
suppression does not cease, and the KKK may march on Congress on the Fourth of July, and
then march into St. Augustine and Mississippi. Brandenburg was prosecuted under the Ohio
Criminal Syndicalism statute for “advocating the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage,
violence, or unlawful means of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political
reform” and “voluntarily assembling with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed
to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.” He was charged with $1,000 fine and
10 years in prison.
Ruling: The statute violated rights to free speech and assembly. The court ruled that the
Government constitutionally cannot forbid or suppress speech unless it is “directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action” and is actually “likely to incite or produce such action.” By
this measure, the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute is overly broad in that it does not distinguish
between advocacy and criminal action.
INDEX: 1-9 n/a, 10-no (0%). Score: 100%
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14. Tinker v. Des Moines School District (1969)
FACTS: Two students wore black armbands protesting the Vietnam War and they were asked to
remove their armbands but refused. The students were suspended until they were ready to return
without the armbands.
Ruling: The school’s prohibition of black armbands in political protest of the Vietnam War was
in violation of the students’ 1st Amendment rights to free speech and expression. The students’
symbolic speech represents “pure speech” rather than conduct. The armband prohibition was
viewpoint discrimination given that it was the only type of symbolic speech which had been
singled out for prohibition. There was no evidence that authorities had reason to anticipate the
wearing of armbands would substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon
the rights of other students. A student may express their opinions if they do so in a way that is
undisruptive in the school environment. Symbolic political speech is permitted by students in a
school environment so long as it does not materially or substantially interfere.
INDEX: 1-9 n/a (0%), 10-yes (-10%)13. Score: 90%
15. Lloyd Corporations v. Tanner (1972)
FACTS: Donald Tanner, a Vietnam War protestor was distributing anti-war handbills inside the
Lloyd Center Mall in Portland, Oregon. The Lloyd Center Mall was a privately-owned business
intended for public use which did not allow for the distribution of handbills inside the mall and
the handbills did not have content related to the Mall. While Tanner and company were
distributing handbills, mall security informed them they were to stop their distribution or be
arrested. They stopped their distribution and filed suit against Lloyd Corporation accusing
violation to their First Amendment right to free speech.
Ruling: Lloyd Corporation did not violate Tanner’s (& co.’s) First Amendment right to free
speech when they refused to allow the distribution of handbills inside their privately-owned
shopping mall. This case differs from the Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza
Inc. case where the location was relevant to the protestors’ point. In this case, the content of the
handbills did not directly relate to the shopping mall, nor was inside the shopping mall the only
reasonable opportunity to carry out their intentions. The First Amendment is not guaranteed
within privately-owned shopping centers if the content of the message is irrelevant to the
operation of the shopping center.

13

Later rulings restricted student speech on the notion that students could become distracted from their learning
material. The Tinker ruling also did not clearly expand all First Amendment rights to students which was used to
suppress student speech later on by permitting school administrators to be the arbiters of what expression and
academic inquiry is appropriate for the classroom and curriculum.
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INDEX: 1-yes (-10%), 2-possible (-10%), 3-no (-10%), 4-bountiful alternatives (+5%), 5-no,
someone else’s liberties or rights were infringed upon (+5%), 6-no (+10%), 7-yes (-10%), 8-n/a
(0%), 9-n/a (0%), 10-n/a (0%). Score: 80%
16. Lehman v. Shaker Heights (1974)
FACTS: Lehman was a political candidate running for the Ohio House of Representatives in a
district which included the city of Shaker Heights. Shaker Heights allowed commercial
advertising on their city busses but had a rule against political advertising on city-owned busses.
Lehman challenged that rule when he unsuccessfully attempted to buy space for campaign
advertisements, claiming the rule violated the First Amendment freedom of speech clause.
Ruling: The Shaker Heights city rule barring political advertising on city-owned busses did not
violate the 1st Amendment. A city transit system has a right to make reasonable choices about
the type of advertising allowed on city busses. Favoring long-term advertising would be more
profitable to the city than short-term candidacy or issue-oriented advertisements. To allow for
such advertisement would subject city bus users to “the blare of political propaganda” as a
captive audience. Public transportation is not a public forum.
INDEX: 1-unstated (0%), 2-present and petty (-5%), 3-no (-10%), 4-bountiful alternatives
(+5%), 5-unclear (0%)14, 6-no (+10%), 7-yes (-10%), 8-n/a (0%), 9-n/a (0%), 10-n/a (0%).
Score: 90%
17. Erznoznik v. Jacksonville (1975)
FACTS: A film was shown in a drive-in theater which showed non-obscene nudity. The nudity
was visible from the public street, so the theater was charged with violating a city ordinance
which prohibited showing films which contained nudity visible from a public area.
Ruling: The Jacksonville ordinance restricting nudity on film visible from a public space is in
violation of the 1st Amendment. So long as the unwilling viewer has opportunity to look away,
the burden falls onto them to do so, but the state cannot restrict otherwise protected speech for
the sake of the predicted offended viewer. Furthermore, film which portrays non-obscene nudity
cannot be limited broadly for the fact of nudity. Finally, to the argument that nudity visible to
public roads would distract motorists, the Court argued “fleeting and innocent glimpses of
nudity,” would not be more dangerous content portrayed on the screen such as violence. The

14

Does the local government’s right to make money suffice as a person having their rights violated? Do people
really have a right to not be a member of a captive audience to a political message on public transportation? How
might this have been different if the political message was communicated by bus passengers rather than a passive
advertisement?
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Government cannot decide which otherwise protected speech is so offensive it must be
prohibited. Speech cannot be prohibited merely because it offends.
INDEX: 1-9 n/a, 10-yes (-10%). Score: 90%
18. Southeastern Promotion, Ltd. v. Conrad (1975)
FACTS: The municipal board managing city theaters in Chattanooga did not want to show the
musical “Hair.” They refused on the grounds that the production would not be “in the best
interest of the community.” When the Supreme Court addressed the case, they did not get to the
alleged obscenity of the case that had been a major issue in the lower courts.
Ruling: The municipal board’s refusal to permit the showing of the musical “Hair” was in
violation of the 1st Amendment due to prior restraint imposed without sufficient procedural
safeguards. Municipal theaters are “public forums designed for and dedicated to expressive
activities.” There was no appropriate application of time, place, or manner restrictions related to
the nature of the facility. No rights of others would be violated by the production and no
unconsenting captive audience existed. It does not matter if the petitioner could have used a
privately-owned theater in the city, they had a right to the municipal theater: “that alone would
not justify an otherwise impermissible prior restraint.”
INDEX: 1-9 n/a, 10-no (0%). Score: 100%
19. Young v. American Mini Theaters (1976)
FACTS: American Mini Theaters opened two adult theaters and bookstores. A Detroit ordinance
required that “adult” theaters not be within 1,000 feet of any two other “regulated uses” (such as
bars, billiard halls, hotels and cabarets) or within 500 feet of a residential area. An “adult”
establishment was a theater that presented “material distinguished or characterized by emphasis
on matters depicting, describing or relating to ‘specified sexual activities’ or ‘specified
anatomical areas.’” The theaters were challenged by the ordinance because they were located
within 1,000 feet of two other “regulated uses.” American Mini Theaters sued the city on the
grounds that the ordinance put undue burden on First Amendment rights of speech, expression
and press and violated the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The city argued the
zoning law was necessary because the adult theaters near several “regulated uses” tended to
attract “undesirable transients, adversely affected property values, and caused an increase in
crime.”
Ruling: The Detroit ordinances did not violate the 14th or 1st Amendment. While speech should
be protected by the furthest extent possible, obscene speech is not fully protected by the 1st
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Amendment, but it is still protected from full suppression. The city’s interest in preserving the
character of its neighborhoods adequately supported the classification of sexual films to location
restrictions in order to allow the city a “reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to
admittedly serious problems.” Government may use content in furthering a substantial
government interest in enforcing place restriction.
INDEX: 1-to some (-5%), 2-possible (-10%)15, 3-no (-10%), 4-less effective or compromised
alternatives (-5%), 5-yes (-15%), 6-yes (-10%), 7-no (0%), 8-n/a (0%), 9-yes (-10%), 10-n/a
(0%). Score: 35%
20. Hudgens v. NLRB (1976)
FACTS: Labor picketing took place inside a private shopping center. Picketers were employees
of a warehouse maintained by a store owner at the private shopping center and were on strike.
Ruling: The First Amendment freedom of speech, redress of grievances, assembly, and
expression does not protect labor picketing inside a private shopping center about a matter that
relates to the operation of the shopping center. If the respondent in the Lloyd case did not have
the First Amendment right to distribute handbills concerning Vietnam, then the respondent in
this case does not have the right to advertise their strike in the shopping center. The First
Amendment is not guaranteed within privately-owned shopping centers, even if the content of
the speech concerns the operation of the shopping center.
INDEX: 1-unstated (0%), 2-present and petty (-5%), 3-no (-10%), 4-less effective or
compromised alternatives (-5%), 5-no, someone else’s liberties or rights were infringed upon
(+5%), 6-maybe (0%), 7-indirectly (-5%), 8-n/a (0%), 9-n/a (0%), 10-n/a (0%). Score: 80%
21. Collin v. Smith (1978)
FACTS: The National Socialist Party of America (NSPA) wanted to have a rally advocating for
White Rights in Skokie, Illinois, a town with a high Jewish population. In response, Skokie
enacted three ordinances for public demonstrations. (1) demonstrators must be approved for a
permit, (2) no materials within Skokie may be distributed which intentionally “promote and
incited hatred against persons by any reason of their race, national origin, or religion,” and (3) no
military-style uniforms may be worn during public demonstrations. The NSPA applied for a
permit for a 30-50 participant march which would feature wearing uniforms with swastikas and
banners with statements such as “White Free Speech,” “Free Speech for the White Man,” and
15

Seaman, C., & Linz, D. (2014). Are Adult Businesses Crime Hotspots? Comparing Adult Businesses to Other
Locations in Three Cities. Journal of Criminology, 2014, 1-14. doi:10.1155/2014/783461
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“Free Speech for White America.” A Jewish ACLU attorney challenged the Skokie ordinances
on the bases of the 1st Amendment.
Ruling: The NSPA’s planned demonstration was protected by the 1st Amendment; the enacted
Skokie ordinances violated the 1st Amendment. A state may not criminalize the peaceful
expression of unpopular views. There was no evidence that violence would occur if the rally
were to take place. Whether an idea is valid or not is not for the courts to proclaim and restrict
non-valid ideas. The 1st Amendment cannot be restricted in anticipation of mental trauma.
Speech which “invites dispute'' cannot be criminalized. While the town argued their fair housing
policy would be undercut by the spread of racially defamatory material, one of the purposes of
the rights of free speech is that government’s policies may be undercut by the exercise of it.
INDEX: 1-9 n/a, 10-yes, but they are narrow, well defined, and necessary to ensure a significant
public interest (-5%). Score: 95%
22. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (1978)
FACTS: George Carlin had a twelve-minute monologue called “Filthy Words,” where Carlin
gave a satire on “the words you couldn’t say on the public, uh, airwaves,” including “shit, piss,
fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits.” The program was played during the
midafternoon and advised listeners immediately before starting that the program would include,
“sensitive language which might be regarded as offensive to some.” The FCC received a
complaint from a man who said he heard the broadcast when he was driving with his young son.
The FCC responded by issuing a Declaratory Order designed to channel certain words depicting
sexual and excretory activity “to times of day when children most likely would not be exposed.”
Ruling: The 1st Amendment does not prohibit the FCC from restricting the broadcast of
offensive language. If vulgar words are used in the context of political content or have some
other literary, scientific, or social value, they may be protected. However, the context of this
monologue made the content undisputedly “vulgar,” “offensive,” and “shocking.” In some
contexts, such speech is protected. In the context of public radio during midafternoon however, it
is not. It violates the privacy of an individual’s home because people are constantly tuning in and
out of the radio, which may cause them to miss the prior warning for the “unexpected program
content.” Simply turning off the radio upon hearing vulgar language does not protect against a
harm that has already taken place. Furthermore, the media of radio is too easily accessible to
young children who may learn curse words from the program. We are not captive audiences to
speech within the sanctuary of our own homes.
INDEX: 1-to some (-5%), 2-present and petty (-5%), 3-less effective or compromised
alternatives (-5%), 5-someone else’s liberties or rights were at risk (+3%), 6-yes (-10%), 7-no
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(0%), 8-n/a (0%), 9-somewhat, but there is other similar content available (-5%), 10-n/a (0%).
Score: 73%
23. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins (1980)
FACTS: Students sought to solicit signatures for a petition protesting a UN resolution against
Zionism in a privately-owned shopping center. The shopping center had a nondiscriminatory
policy of barring all expressive activity not directly related to its commercial purposes. The
California state constitution guarantees speakers who are “reasonably exercising” expressive
rights access to a privately-owned shopping center, even though the Supreme Court had rejected
such protection as a matter of the First Amendment.
Ruling: State constitutional provisions permitting individuals to exercise free speech and petition
on the property of a privately-owned shopping center open to the public do not violate the
shopping center owner’s First Amendment right not to be forced by the state to open their private
property as a public forum. The views expressed by the pamphlets were not likely to be
associated with the views of the owner. The State did not dictate a specific message to be
displayed so there was no danger of government content discrimination for or against a particular
message. If PruneYard wanted to expressly disavow connection with the message, they could
post signs in the area where the speakers or handbillers stood. States are free to reasonably
expand individual liberty. The California constitution makes shopping malls within the state
public forums. Individual free speech rights may be superior to the rights of the owner.
INDEX: 1-9 n/a (0%), 10-yes, but they are narrow, well-defined, and necessary to ensure a
significant public interest (-5%). Score: 95%
24. Connick v. Myers (1983)
FACTS: Myers had worked as an Assistant District Attorney for over five years. Her boss,
Connick transferred her to a different section of the criminal court and Myers strongly opposed
the transfer. She prepared a questionnaire for her co-workers asking for their opinions on the
transfer policy, office moral, confidence in supervisors, and if they felt pressure to work in
political campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates. Upon finding out about the
questionnaire, Connick immediately fired her for insubordination.
Ruling: Public officials do not have a right to distribute questionnaires regarding internal
operations which may indirectly impact public affairs and may criticize authorities in the
workplace. The speech of public employees is only protected when it explicitly regards matters
of public concern. Meyers’ speech only dealt with personal and internal office issues. The district
court placed too high of a burden on Connick to show that Meyers’ speech substantially
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interfered with the operation of the office. The employer reasonably believed Meyers’ speech
would reasonably interfere with office operations by undermining the authority figures in the
office. A balance must be struck between the interests of the citizen and the state.
INDEX: 1-unstated (0%), 2-possible (-10%), 3-maybe (-5%), 4-no obvious alternatives (-10%),
5-yes (-15%), 6-yes (-10%), 7-indirectly (-5%), 8-n/a (0%), 9-n/a (0%), 10-n/a (0%).
Score: 55%
25. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent (1984)
FACTS: A Los Angeles Municipal Code prohibited the posting of signs on public property. The
Taxpayers for Vincent challenged this code as a violation to their First Amendment right to free
speech because they wanted to post political signs for a local election.
Ruling: The Los Angeles Municipal Code prohibiting the posting of signs on public property
does not violate the 1st Amendment. Total bans on a particular mode of communication are
constitutional so long as they satisfy a substantial government interest and restrict speech no
greater than is essential to achieve that objective. An interest in an aesthetic environment is a
substantial government interest. Given that the ban is viewpoint neutral, the ban must address a
substantial government interest and restrict speech no greater than is essential to achieve that
objective. The ban is a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction and is narrowly tailored to
serve the interest of eliminating visual clutter. This is a ban on the exact source of the evil it
sought to remedy, unlike pamphleting bans which punished a potential littering risk of the
activity by recipients of the leaflets. The public ban which still allows for posters on private
property is understandable because private citizens have the right to control their own property
and it enables more routes of communication. The remaining routes of communication are
adequate (speech, distributing literature); there is nothing the appellees indicate is uniquely
valuable or important with the particular mode of communication banned. Just because property
is public does not mean it is a public forum, especially since it is not demonstrated to be a
traditional public form; the government has a right to reserve public property for its intended
purpose. A less restrictive ordinance on posters may not be constitutionally permissible because
they generate a risk of content discrimination.
INDEX: 1-unstated (0%), 2-present and petty (-5%), 3-no (-10%), 4-less effective or
compromised alternatives (-5%), 5-yes (-15%), 6-maybe or to a slight degree (0%), 7-yes
(-10%), 8-n/a (0%), 9-n/a (0%), 10-n/a (0%). Score: 55%
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26. Frisby v. Schultz (1988)
FACTS: In a suburb of Milwaukee, a group of 11- 40+ people picketed the residence of a doctor
who performed abortions. The town responded by enacting a flat ban on all residential picketing,
barring picketing “on or about the residence of any individual.”
Ruling: A flat ban on all residential picketing focused on an individual’s residence is not in
violation of the First Amendment right to free speech and assembly. The ordinance was narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest and left open ample alternative channels of
communication. E.g. individuals could still march the residential streets, proselytize door to door,
and distribute literature. There is a significant government interest in protecting unwilling
recipients from communications within the sanctuary of their own homes. Narrowly tailored
residential picketing bans serving a significant government interest of protecting captive
audiences are constitutionally allowable so long as other reasonable opportunities for
communication are available. Focused picketing of an individual’s home is not protected
expression due to time, place, and manner restrictions.
INDEX: 1-unstated (0%), 2-present and petty (-5%), 3-no (-10%), 4-bountiful alternatives
(+5%), 5-no, someone else’s liberties or rights were infringed upon (+5%), 6-maybe (0%), 7-yes
(-10%), 8-n/a (0%), 9-n/a (0%), 10-n/a (0%). Score: 85%
27. TX v. Johnson (1989)
FACTS: Johnson publicly burned an American flag as a means of political protest of the Reagan
administration outside of the Dallas City Hall where the Republican National Convention was
taking place in Dallas. Other forms of vandalism had taken place at the protest, but not by
Johnson. Johnson was handed the flag which had been taken down from a flagpole outside one
of the targeted buildings and burned it. While the flag burned, the crowd changed “America, the
red, the white, and blue, we spit on you.” After the demonstration, a witness gathered the flag
remains and buried them in his backyard. Johnson, the only individual who was charged with a
crime, was charged with the desecration of a venerated object. He was sentenced to one year in
prison and fined $2,000.
Ruling: The application of the Texas statute to Johnson’s symbolic flag burning was in violation
of his 1st Amendment rights of expression. Political flag burning is constitutionally protected
expression. “The expressive, overtly political nature of this conduct was both intentional and
overwhelmingly apparent [and thus implicates] the First Amendment.” The government claimed
interest in preventing breaches of the peace and “preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood
and national unity.” The interest in maintaining the peace is moot in this case because there was
no indication that a breach to the peace was at risk. It is necessary that the specific context in
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which an expression occurs be seriously considered and not allowable to assume that every flag
burning possesses the potential for a breach of the peace. The government interest in “preserving
the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity” is a content-based restriction given that
ceremonial burning to retire a flag is permitted and preferred. “...The Government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.” The state may not allow flag burning as a symbol in only one direction. To allow
the government to designate “symbols to communicate only a limited set of messages would be
to enter territory having no discernible or defensible boundaries.” The way to preserve the flag as
a symbol of nationhood and national unity is not to punish those who feel differently about these
matters, it is to persuade them they are wrong.
INDEX: 1-9 n/a (0%), 10-no (0%). Score: 100%
28. Barnes v. Glenn Theater (1991)
FACTS: The Glen Theatre and Kitty Kat Lounge provided totally nude dancing as entertainment.
An Indiana Statute required dancers wear “pasties” and “G-strings” in public spaces. The
respondents argued Indiana’s prohibition against complete nudity was a violation of the First
Amendment Freedom of Expression.
Ruling: The Indiana prohibition against complete public nudity does not violate the 1st
Amendment’s protection of expression. There is a substantial government interest in order and
morality and nude dancing in this form is not constitutionally protected expressive activity.
Given that the public indecency statute furthered a substantial government interest unrelated to
the dancers’ messages, the limitation on the expressive activity was a justified incidental
limitation. Conduct may not simply be labeled as expression and then be granted 1st Amendment
protections.
INDEX: 1-to some (-5%), 2-present and petty (-5%), 3-maybe (-5%), 4-bountiful alternatives
(+5%), 5-unclear (0%), 6-yes (-10%), 7-no (0%), 8-potentially (-5%), 9-yes (-10%), 10-n/a (0%).
Score: 65%
29. Forsyth County, Georgia v. Nationalist Movement (1992)
FACTS: Forsyth County had a county ordinance which required demonstrators pay a fee of up to
$1,000 to pay for the public cost of law enforcements which “exceeds the usual and normal
cost.” The law was made in response to a civil rights protest which cost $670,000 for 3,000 state
and local police and national guard members to arrest a crowd of 1,000 counter demonstrators. In
this case, a group called the Nationalist Movement wanted to hold a demonstration in opposition
to Martin Luther King, Jr. Day. They were assessed a fee of $100 and the group sued the county
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instead of holding their rally. That amount did not include a calculation for the estimated cost of
law enforcement.
Ruling: County fees to demonstrators based on the estimated cost of additional law enforcement
from expected backlash violate the First Amendment Right to free speech and assembly. The
ordinance is invalid because it leaves “impermissibly standardless discretion in the hands of the
county administrator.” There is no way the decision can be reviewed on objective factors and it
allows for a public official to arbitrarily apply fees to encourage some views and discourage
others. It also allows for the heckler's veto—the speaker’s speech is financially burdened by the
administrator’s estimation of the amount of hostility that is likely to be created by the content
that offends. The $1,000 cap does not save the ordinance because “a tax based on the content of
the speech does not become more constitutional because it is a small tax.” Time, place, and
manner restrictions must be narrowly tailored to serve a reasonable government interest and
cannot be arbitrarily decided by a single government official.
INDEX: 1-9 n/a (0%), 10-no (0%). Score: 100%
30. Madsen v. Women’s Health Center (1994)
FACTS: A Florida state injunction limited the activities of antiabortion protestors on the public
streets outside an abortion clinic. The protestors had violated a previous narrower injunction
against blocking clinic access. The current injunction had several requirements: (1) a 36-foot
buffer zone around the building, (2) noise and image restrictions prohibiting amplified noise that
could be heard inside the clinic between 7:30 a.m. and noon Mondays through Saturdays, and
images observable from inside the clinic, (3) a requirement that protestors refrain from
approaching clinic patients without invitation within 300 feet of the clinic, and (4) a prohibition
of picketing, demonstrating, or using sound amplification equipment within 300 feet of the clinic
staff residences.
Ruling: The Florida injunction was partially in violation of the protestors’ First Amendment
rights to assembly and speech. The injunction was content-neutral. The petitioners had violated a
previous injunction and the new injunction applies specifically to them. Liberties may be
restricted when the law is broken. The injunction serves a number of significant government
interests: protecting women’s freedom to seek lawful medical or counseling services in
connection with her pregnancy, ensuring public safety and order, the free flow of traffic on
public streets and sidewalks, protecting property rights, and protecting the physical and
psychological well-being of an audience captive by medical circumstance. The 36-foot buffer
zone around the entrances prohibiting “congregating, picketing, patrolling or demonstrating” is
permissible, but it cannot be applied to the sides and back of the building as that speech does not
interfere with clinic access. Noise restriction is okay, image restriction is not. Noise control is
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important for surgery and recovery, but the display of unwanted images outside the clinic can be
managed by closing the blinds. The provision restricting approaching patients within 300 feet is
difficult to justify because it prohibits all uninvited approaches of patients, regardless of how
peaceful the content may be. It burdens more speech than necessary to prevent intimidation and
to ensure access to the clinic. The 300-foot buffer zone prohibiting picketing or demonstrating of
the clinic staff residences is overbroad and there is not sufficient justification for such a broad
ban on picketing. It would be better handled as it was in Frisby with a prohibition of focused
picketing. Special stringency is required in the context of an injunction because an injunction is
at higher risk of being overly restrictive and discriminatory than a general ordinance. Time,
place, and manner restrictions must be content neutral and narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest.
INDEX: 1-unstated (0%), 2-possible (-10%), 3-yes (0%), 4-bountiful alternatives (+5%), 5-no,
someone else’s liberties or rights were infringed upon (+5%), 6-no (+10%), 7-yes (-10%), 8-n/a
(0%), 9-n/a (0%), 10-no (0%). Score: 100%
31. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia (1995)
FACTS: The University of Virginia had a policy prohibiting the use of activities fees for any
“religious activity,” activity that “primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a
deity or an ultimate reality.” Rosenberger, a student at the University, requested $5,800 for the
publishing cost of “Wide Awake: A Christina Perspective at the University of Virginia.” The
school, who’s fees were generally for the use of paying costs of extracurricular activities,
including the costs of printing various student edited publications, refused to pay.
Ruling: The University of Virginia violated Rosenberger’s First Amendment rights by refusing
funding for a student publication they would have otherwise funded had it not been for the
pro-religious content of the proposed publication. The Court found this to be a case of viewpoint
discrimination, not content discrimination. The perspective of pro-religion was prohibited,
“result[ing] in the refusal to make third-party payments, for the subjects discussed were
otherwise within the approved category of publications.” There is a clear distinction between the
University’s own messages and the messages of students’ private speech. Because they had
offered to pay for the publication of students’ messages as third-party contractors of a private
message, they may not silence the expression of selected viewpoints. The restriction of religious
activity must be justified by a compelling state interest.
INDEX: 1-9 n/a (0%), 10-no (0%). Score: 100%
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32. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston (1995)
FACTS: The GLIB group wanted to join Hurley’s St. Patrick’s Day Parade. The parade was set
to take place in public streets but was put on by private organizers. The organizers were okay
with the GLIB group members joining the parade, but not with them being their own unit with an
identifying banner. A Massachusetts state antidiscrimination law forbids discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation in the admission or treatment of any person in a place of public
accommodation.
Ruling: The Massachusetts court order mandating the inclusion of the GLIB group in the St.
Patrick’s Day parade according to the Massachusetts anti-discrimination law was in violation of
the organizers 1st Amendment rights of free speech and association. The parade was set by a
private group who has a rightful intent to portray whatever message they seek to communicate
by the parade. The GLIB members were not excluded from participating in the parade as
individuals, nor was their message blocked as they could have put on their own parade. The
government may not compel a private entity to include particular messages in a privately
organized parade based on state anti-discrimination laws.
INDEX: 1-9 n/a (0%), 10-no (0%). Score: 100%
33. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000)
FACTS: James Dale, an otherwise qualified scoutmaster, was excluded from the Boy Scouts of
America on the ground that he had publicly disclosed his homosexuality. The Boy Scouts
claimed that it was their First Amendment expressive association right to exclude individuals but
the New Jersey public accommodations law bars discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.
Ruling: The forced inclusion of an individual in a group infringes upon the right to expressive
association if their inclusion impacts the group’s ability to advocate their viewpoint. Through
their mission statement, the group engages in expressive association; seeking to transmit a
specific system of values equates to engaging in expressive activity. The Boy Scouts believe that
homosexuality is at odds with their values embodied in the Scout Oath of “morally straight” and
“clean.” If the Boy Scouts do “not want to promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of
behavior,” it is their right to express that viewpoint. Having an openly gay scoutmaster
significantly burdens their ability to express that viewpoint. Expressive Association allows
rejection of opinions inconsistent with stated views of the organization.
INDEX: 1-9 n/a (0%), 10-yes greatly (-15%)16. Score: 85%
16

The ruling permits the suppression of LGBTQ individuals’ access to free expression in the public sphere.
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34. VA v. Black (2003)
FACTS: Three individuals were separately prosecuted under a Virginia statute which stated: “It
shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of intimidating any person or group
of persons, to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the property of another, a highway or other
public place. Any person who shall violate any provision of this section shall be guilty of a Class
6 felony,” and “Any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to
intimidate a person or group of persons.”
Ruling: Cross burning has long been a symbol of threat of violence or death from the KKK. Past
rulings (Watts) have ruled that true threats are not protected speech. Discrimination prohibiting
all forms of a particular content are not permissible—rather a particular type of threat can be
restricted. The Virginia statute restricts cross burning with “the intent to intimidate,” not mere
cross burning. Therefore, the statue itself is not unconstitutional. The prima facie provision
which states that cross burning alone is evidence of intimidation is overbroad and violates the 1st
Amendment because it “would create unacceptable risk to the suppression of ideas.” Speech
cannot be prohibited merely because it offends.
INDEX: 1-yes (-10%), 2-present and significant (-2%), 3-yes (0%)17, 4-less effective alternatives
(-5%), 5-someone else’s liberties or rights were severely infringed upon (+10%), 6-yes (-10%),
7-yes (-10%)18, 8-yes (-10%), 9-n/a (0%), 10-yes, but they are narrow, well-defined, and
necessary to ensure a significant public interest (-5%). Score: 58%
35. San Diego v. Roe (2004)
FACTS: A San Diego police officer made videos of himself stripping off a police uniform and
masturbating, including while issuing a traffic ticket, and sold them online on eBay, listing
himself in his user profile as employed in the field of law enforcement. He was terminated from
the police force and alleged that the termination violated his right to free speech.
Ruling: Roe’s termination from the police force after his inappropriate activities do not qualify as
a violation to his 1st Amendment rights. The police department demonstrated legitimate and
substantial interests of its own that were compromised by his speech. His activities were related
and linked to his employment and injurious to his employer. Pickering did not hold that any and
all statements by public employees are entitled to balancing. Such speech entitled to balancing
17

The Court determined cross burning to be a “true threat” given the historical pattern of white supremacists
following such an act with violence or murder. A threat to one’s life, family, and/or community is likely to incur
psychological distress and could lead to post-traumatic stress disorder which has been shown to have detrimental
effects on brain functioning. Nutt, D. J., & Malizia, A. L. (2004). Structural and functional brain changes in
posttraumatic stress disorder. The Journal of clinical psychiatry, 65 Suppl 1, 11–17.
18
Historically, racism in the United States is strongly politicized (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018).
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must touch on a matter of public concern--something that is a subject of legitimate news interest,
in general interest of value and concern to the public at the time of publication. A balance must
be struck between the interests of the citizen and the state.
INDEX: 1-yes (-10%), 2-present and significant (-2%), 3-maybe (-5%)19, 4-less effective or
compromised alternatives (-5%), 5-no, someone else’s liberties or rights were infringed upon
(+5%)20, 6-maybe or to a slight degree (0%), 7-no (0%), 8-potentially (-5%), 9-somewhat, but
there is other similar content available (-5%), 10-n/a (0%). Score: 73%
36. Morse v. Frederick (2007)
FACTS: Frederick a high school student unfurled a banner at a school sanctioned event
containing the message “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.” The school-approved class trip took place
when the Olympic torch passed through Juneau, Alaska and the local high school principal
allowed students to go outside the school to watch under teacher supervision. When the student
unfurled the banner, the principle interpreted it as drug-related speech, confiscated it, and
punished Frederick. The Juneau school board policy specifically prohibited “any assembly or
public expression that advocates the use of substances that are illegal to minors.”
Ruling: Reprimanding a high school student for a banner interpreted to contain a drug-related
message at a school-sanctioned event did not violate his First Amendment right to free speech.
The student cannot claim it was not clear that he was “at school” given that he was in the midst
of his fellow students, during school hours, at a school-sanctioned event, under teacher
supervision. This case does not involve a political debate over the criminalization of drug use or
possession. The school district has a reasonable and compelling interest in deterring drug use in
schoolchildren. The danger is far more serious and palpable than the undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance or mere desire to avoid discomfort and unpleasantness that
accompany an unpopular viewpoint (Tinker). “The concern here is not that Frederick’s speech
was offensive, but that it was reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.” Schools may
claim a reasonable and compelling interest in restricting speech promoting illegal drug use.

19

It is possible that civilians could feel unsafe around a police officer who has engaged in unprofessional sexual
misconduct.
20
The tax-paying body has a right to a professional and trustworthy law enforcement body using government
resources in the best interest of the communities they serve if that is the system the locally and democratically
elected legislature has installed.
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INDEX: 1-yes (-10%), 2-possible (-10%), 3-no (-10%)21, 4-bountiful alternatives (+5%), 5-yes
(-15%), 6-yes (-10%)22, 7-no (0%), 8-n/a (0%), 9-no (0%), 10-n/a (0%). Score: 50%
37. FCC v. Fox Television (2009)
FACTS: The FCC had previously allowed for speech which contained “fleeting expletives.”
During the Golden Globe award Bono had previously used the word “fuck” as an intensifier to
describe how “brilliant” he found the award. At another award ceremony thereafter, Cher and
Nicole Richie used F- and S- words in the same fleeting manner, to which the FCC issued a
sanction of liability to Fox Television Stations finding those utterances “indecent.” The FCC
argued that there was no distinction between explicates and descriptions of sexual or excretory
functions therefore to allow for “automatic exemption for ‘isolated or fleeting’ expletives
unfairly forces viewers (including children)” to take “the first blow.” Fox argued that under the
Administrative Procedure Act, the FCC’s policy change without any due warning was “arbitrary
and capricious.”
Ruling: The FCC’s order charging liability to Fox News for spoken fleeting expletives is not
unlawfully “arbitrary and capricious” under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Court
declined to make a statement on the constitutionality of the FCC’s order under the First
Amendment but did note “any chilled references to excretory and sexual material ‘surely lie at
the periphery of First Amendment concern’” (Pacifica).
INDEX: 1-to some (-5%), 2-present and petty (-5%), 3-no (-10%), 4-less effective or
compromised alternatives (-5%), 5-someone else’s liberties or rights were infringed upon (+5%),
6-yes (-10%), 7-no (0%), 8-n/a (0%), 9-yes (-10%), 10-n/a (0%). Score: 60%
38. Christian Legal Society v. Martinez (2010)
FACTS: The Christian Legal Society wanted to become an official registered student
organization. But the group did not allow any student to participate; you had to sign a “Statement
of Faith” and renounce “unrepentant homosexual conduct.” Hastings College of Law refused
their request because they require that RSOs allow any student to participate, become a member,
or seek leadership positions in the organization regardless of their status or beliefs.
21

The case’s dissent by Justice Stevens joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg argues the banner was nonsensical
and did not advocate drug use. Even so, “no one seriously maintains that drug advocacy (much less Frederick’s
ridiculous sign) comes with the vanishingly small category of speech that can be prohibited because of its feared
consequences. It is implausible that the message on the banner would actually persuade the average or even the
dumbest student to change their drug usage behavior.
22
A concurrence written by Justice Thomas elaborates to say schools act “in loco parentis.” The Constitution does
not afford students a right to free speech in public schools. In the past, the courts have deferred to the schools’
authority to make and enforce rules for their students. Tinker ought to be dispensed. This concurrence implies that
the case may be taken to mean that students are disadvantaged in their access to 1st Amendment rights while at
school.
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Ruling: The Hastings college “all-comers policy” requirement for campus groups to be granted
Registered Student Organization status did not violate Christian Legal Society’s 1st Amendment
rights to freedom of speech and association. Considering the educational context, Hastings
“all-comers” policy is reasonable and viewpoint neutral. The policy helps police the
Nondiscrimination Policy without inquiring into an RSO’s motivation for membership
restriction. It has no distinction between groups based on their message or perspective.
Traditional public forums and created public forums opened for that purpose are held to strict
scrutiny of restrictions. This case involves a limited public forum (a forum limited to use by
certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain subjects), which may impose
restrictions which are reasonable and viewpoint neutral.
INDEX: 1-no (0%), 2-present and significant (-2%), 3-yes (0%), 4-less effective or compromised
alternatives (-5%), 5-no, someone else’s liberties or rights were infringed upon (+5%), 6-yes
(-10%), 7-indirectly (-5%), 8-yes (-10%), 9-n/a (0%), 10-n/a (0%). Score: 73%
39. Doe v. Reed (2010)
FACTS: The Washington’s Public Records Act requires that the names and addresses of those
who sign referendum ballot petitions be publicly disclosed. The challenge was brought by
supporters of a petition challenging a state law extending certain benefits to same-sex couples.
Ruling: Washington’s Public Record Act does not violate the First Amendment freedom of
speech; signers of referendum ballot petitions do not have a right to anonymity if their safety is
potentially threatened by signing a particular petition. Under exacting scrutiny, a substantial
relation between the disclosure requirement and a sufficiently important government interest is
required. There is a sufficient government interest in “preserving the integrity of the electoral
processes by combating fraud, detecting invalid signatures, and fostering government
transparency and accountability.” Typical referendum interests do not vary in danger from the
referendum matter in this case.
INDEX:1-to some (-5%), 2-possible (-10%), 3-maybe (-5%), 4-less accessible alternatives
(-5%), 5-someone else’s liberties or rights were at risk (+3%), 6-yes (-10%), 7-yes (-10%), 8-no
(0%), 9-n/a (0%), 10-n/a (0%). Score: 58%
40. Snyder v. Phelps (2011)
FACTS: The Westboro Baptist Church protested a military funeral from 1,000 feet away on
public land. The signs used to protest contained themes of God, the cursed nature of the United
States, supporting the country’s military enemies, and homophobia. A Maryland jury charged
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them liable for “$2.9 million in compensatory damages and $8 million in punitive damages for
the torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion and civil
conspiracy.”
Ruling: The 1st Amendment protects Westboro Baptist Church funeral picketers from being
charged for intentionally inflicting emotional distress upon the deceased’s family. The distinction
between speech relating to public or private matters determines the state’s ability to restrict the
speech. “…restricting speech on purely private matters does not implicate the same
constitutional concerns as limiting speech on matters of public interest.” Because the nature of
their speech made an argument that pertained to public interest (the United States’ policies on
homosexuality), it was constitutionally protected. “Given that Westboro’s speech was at a public
place on a matter of public concern, that speech is entitled to “special protection” under the First
Amendment. Speech cannot be restricted simply because it offends.
INDEX: 1-9 n/a, 10-yes (-10%). Score: 90%
41. US v. Alvarez (2012)
FACTS: Alvarez, in a California public hearing, falsely claimed that he was a retired marine who
had been wounded in combat and had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. He was
convicted under the Stolen Valor Act which made it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military
decorations or medals and provided an enhanced penalty if the Congressional Medal of Honor
was involved.
Ruling: The Stolen Valor Act criminalizing false claim to military decoration is in violation of
the 1st Amendment. The Court’s libel precedents did not claim that false statements had no
constitutional protection—rather this case requires “exacting scrutiny” be used to evaluate the
content-based restriction. The holding references George Orwell’s 1984, saying the Constitution
stands against the notion that the United States needs Oceania’s Ministry of Truth. For
government to try to punish everyone who has made false statement would “chill the First
Amendment” and create an impermissible restraint on “free speech, thought, and discourse”
which would unground the foundation of American freedom. “The remedy for speech that is
false is speech that is true.”
INDEX: 1-9 n/a, 10-no (0%). Score: 100%
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42. McCullen v. Coakley (2014)
FACTS: A Massachusetts statute created a 35-foot buffer zone around abortion-providing
facilities in which only people using the clinic, working at the clinic, and emergency services
were allowed to enter during business hours.
Ruling: The Massachusetts statue was an unreasonable time, place, and manner restriction in
violation of the First Amendment right to free speech. The statute does not draw content-based
distinctions on its face. A facially neutral law does not become content based simply because it
may disproportionately affect speech on certain topics. It is also viewpoint neutral. “there is
nothing inherently suspect about providing some kind of exemption to allow individuals who
work at the clinics to enter or remain within the buffer zones.” Strict scrutiny is unnecessary;
intermediate scrutiny found that the law was not narrowly tailored because it burdened
“substantially more speech than necessary to further the government’s legitimate interest.” E.g.
restricting one-on-one communication; petitioners are not protestors.
INDEX: 1-9 n/a (0%), 10-yes, but they are narrow, well-defined, and necessary to ensure a
significant public interest (-5%). Score: 95%
43. Elonis v. US (2015)
FACTS: Elonis threatened to kill his ex-wife via a rap-lyric form on Facebook, “Did you know
that it’s illegal for me to say I want to kill my wife? ... It’s one of the only sentences that I’m not
allowed to say…” He was convicted under 18 USC Section 875 c which criminalizes “any
communication containing any threat…to injure the person of another.” The jury was instructed
that an objective intent to threaten was necessary to qualify a “True Threat,” but the defense
argued that a subjective intent to threaten was necessary.
Ruling: A conviction under 181 USC Section 875c requires proof of a subjective intent to
threaten. The conviction was overturned due to the statute’s implicit requirement that intent to
threaten or knowledge that the communication would be understood as a threat be shown, which
was not charged to the jury. The prosecution needed to show that the defense intended the
communication as threat or understood that the communication would be seen as a threat—that
there was a subjective intent to threaten. The reasonable person test does not separate actors
threatening with purposeful intent from innocent, accidental conduct. In order to be convicted,
the law requires proof of a subjective intent to threaten; a speaker may not be convicted out of
ignorance or by the reasonable listener test.
INDEX: 1-9 n/a, 10-yes, but they are narrow, well-defined, and necessary to ensure a significant
public interest (-5%). Score: 95%
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44. Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans (TDSCV) (2015)
FACTS: Texas had a specialty license plate program in which it allowed organizations or
individuals the chance to design “specialty plates” by proposing a plate design comprising a
slogan, a graphic, or both. The TDSCV proposed a plate design featuring a Confederate battle
flag. The Texas Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) rejected the proposal because they
concluded many Texans would find the flag symbol offensive.
Ruling: Texas did not create a limited public forum required to maintain viewpoint neutrality
with its specialty license plate program. The Texas DMV decision to reject the specialty license
plate proposal from the TDSCV did not violate the 1st Amendment right to Free Expression.
Specialty license plates are government speech, not a forum of any type required to First
Amendment strictures. License plates are government speech, not private speech. The state is
speaking on its own behalf, so the forum analysis would not apply. Specialty license plates are a
limited forum; Texas is not simply managing government property but engaging in expressive
conduct. They have a right to determine what messages the state endorses. If an individual
wanted to picture the confederate battle flag in that location, they could have easily done so with
a large bumper sticker. Proposing a license plate with the message has the specific intent to
convey that the State has endorsed that message. Vehicle registration is a privilege, not a
constitutional right.
INDEX: 1-yes (-10%), 2-present and petty (-5%), 3-no (-10%), 4-bountiful alternatives (+5%),
5-yes (-15%), 6-no (+10%), 7-yes (-10%), 8-yes (-10%), 9-n/a (0%), 10-n/a (0%). Score: 55%
45. National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra (2018)
FACTS: The California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and
Transparency Act (FACT Act) required licensed clinics that primarily serve pregnant women to
notify patients that California provides free or low-cost services, including abortions, and to give
them a phone number to call. The law also required unlicensed clinics to notify patients that
California had not licensed the clinics to provide medical services. Both parts of the law—the
licensed and unlicensed notices—were challenged by “crisis pregnancy centers” that aimed to
discourage pregnant women from obtaining abortions.
Ruling:The California Reproductive FACT Act violates the First Amendment freedom of speech
rights of the crisis pregnancy centers by compelling speech unwillingly. The requirement is
content-based regulation of speech. Professional speech can only be regulated when factual,
noncontroversial speech is required or when professional conduct is regulated, and it incidentally
impacts speech. Professional speech has been historically protected outside of those two contexts
in order to protect against the suppression of unpopular ideas rather than the pursuance of
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legitimate regulatory interests. The Act was not sufficiently tailored to the declared government
interest of, “providing low-income women information about state-sponsored health services.”
INDEX: 1-9 n/a (0%), 10-no (0%). Score: 100%
46. Stanley v. GA (1969)
FACTS: Stanley was convicted under a Georgia statute for knowing “possession of obscene
material.” Obscene films were found during a home search for bookmaking evidence. Georgia
defended its law based on Roth and with the argument that, “If the State can protect the body of
the citizen, may it not also protect his mind?”
Ruling: The Georgia statute banning the possession of obscene material violated the 1st
Amendment. The 1st Amendment protects the right to receive information and ideas regardless
of social worth and against a prosecution for mere possession in the privacy of one’s own home.
The Roth test was intended for cases involving the public distribution of obscene material that
has different risks which are not presented in this case. Laws preventing the distribution of
obscene material are necessary to prevent child pornography and the exposure of children and
unconsenting adults to obscene materials. Justifying the law by the argument that a possession
ban is necessary to curb schemes of distribution is not convincing, nor would it justify
infringement of the individual’s right to read or observe what he pleases.
INDEX: 1-9 n/a (0%), 10-yes, but they are intended to serve a public interest (-5%). Score: 95%
47. Paris Adult Theater v. Slaton (1973)
FACTS: Two adult theaters were challenged for having vague signs outside that “did not indicate
the full nature of what was shown. In particular, nothing indicated that the films depicted—as
they did—scenes simulated fellatio, cunnilingus, and group sex intercourse.”
Ruling: By the Miller test, the Georgia statute did not violate the First Amendment freedom of
expression. “States have a legitimate interest in regulating commerce in obscene material and in
regulating exhibition of obscene material in places of public accommodation, including so-called
“adult” theaters from which minors are excluded.” There is a difference between having the right
to own obscene material in the privacy of one’s own home and having a right to have access to
obscene material. To grant the right of such access affects the world around everyone and
impinges on the privacies of others. There is no “privacy” right in a place of public
accommodation.
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INDEX: 1-yes (-10%), 2-present and petty (-5%), 3-no (-10%), 4-no obvious alternatives (-10%),
5-yes (-15%), 6-yes (-10%), 7-no (0%), 8-yes (-10%), 9-yes (-10%), 10-n/a (0%). Score: 20%
48. Jenkins v. GA (1974)
FACTS: The state convicted Jenkins for showing the film “Carnal Knowledge.” While the
subject matter of the picture in a broader sense was sex, the sexual scenes within the film did not
focus on the actors’ bodies or display genitalia. There was non-obscene nudity in the film and the
film was considered to be mainstream, given that it starred prominent actors and had been
nominated for Academy Awards.
Ruling: Jenkins’ obscenity conviction for showing the film “Carnal Knowledge” violated the
First Amendment freedom of speech. While the Miller test does allow the regulation of material
appealing to prurient interest or having elements of patent offensiveness, the jury is not then
given unbridled discretion to determine what is ‘patently offensive.’ The film in question “could
not be found to depict sexual conduct in a patently offensive way.” While the broader theme to
the film was sex, the depictions of sexual conduct were vaguely portrayed and non-obscene. The
nudity in the film could not be determined to be materially, legally, obscene by the Miller
standards. Juries don't have unbridled discretion to determine what is patently offensive.
INDEX: 1-9 n/a (0%), 10-yes (-10%). Score: 90%
49. Packingham v. NC (2017)
FACTS: Packingham was convicted under a state law which made it a felony for a registered sex
offender “to access a commercial social networking web site where the sex offender knows that
the site permits minor children to become members or to create or maintain personal Web
pages.”
Ruling: The North Carolina law was in violation of the 1st Amendment freedom of speech.
Social media is a public forum for democratic discussion. By the 1st Amendment, all people
should “have access to places where they can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak
and listen once more.” Social media allows users to engage in a wide variety of activities
protected by the First Amendment. Although we make this ruling, we recognize that the internet
is a quickly evolving platform and what we “say today might be obsolete tomorrow.” The statute
is overbroad and sweeps broadly into protected First Amendment speech. Convicted criminals
who have served their sentences, “might receive legitimate benefits” from the “world of ideas”
the internet offers, “in particular if they seek to reform and to pursue lawful and rewarding
lives.” Content neutral regulation of speech must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest.
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INDEX: 1-9 n/a (0%), 10-no (0%). Score: 100%
50. US v. Stevens (2010)
FACTS: Stevens was indicted for distributing videos of dogfighting. Dogfighting is unlawful in
all 50 States and in D.C. Stevens challenged 18 U.S.C. Section 48 which criminalized the
commercial creation, sale, or possession of any visual or auditory depiction “in which a living
animal is intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed,” if that conduct in the
material violated a federal or state law and did not have “serious religious, political, scientific,
educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value.” The law was intended to target “crush
videos,” which show torture and killing of helpless animals for sexual fetish, but the text of the
law was not limited to such videos.
Ruling: The federal law criminalizing the commercial production, sale, and possession of audio
and visual materials depicting animal cruelty violated the 1st Amendment. There is no tradition
of excluding depictions of animal cruelty from the First Amendment. The Government is arguing
that a simple balancing test of the value of the speech against the societal costs justifies the law
in question. Such a free-floating test is startling and dangerous; the First Amendment itself
reflects a judgement of balancing the restrictions on the Government and the interests of the
American people. The Government did not defend the constitutionality of the Law beyond its
application to crush videos, but the statue is not narrowly targeted to such conduct and bleeds
into other speech that is clearly protected such as hunting magazines. We do not need to make a
determination on if a more narrowly tailored statue would pass constitutionality given that
U.S.C. Section 48 is overbroad.
INDEX: 1-9 n/a (0%), 10-no (0%). Score: 100%

67
Appendix D
Free Speech Index Score Data

68
Appendix E
Hate Crime Victimization Tables & Graphs

69

70

